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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of capital gains taxation on firms’ investment
and financing decisions. We develop a real options model in which the timing of
investment, the decision to default, and the firm’s capital structure are endogenously
and jointly determined. Our analysis demonstrates that the asymmetric taxation of
capital gains and losses fosters investment by eroding the option value of waiting. It
also shows that firms controlled by taxable investors employ more equity financing,
the higher the firm’s stock price and the worse the firm’s historical performance.
Using a large sample of U.S. industrial firms that are owned by taxable investors be-
tween 1970 and 2008, we present new evidence on corporate investment and financing
policies, which is supportive of the model’s predictions.
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1 Introduction
Taxes are among the most palpable and pervasive distortions that corporations and in-
vestors face in practice. Since the Modigliani-Miller (1958) irrelevancy theorem, financial
economists have purported a number of tax-based theories to explain the observed pat-
terns in corporate investment and financing behavior. While there exists a rich literature
that examines the effects of corporate and ordinary income taxes on capital budgeting,
financial theory has made little headway in explaining the relation between capital gains
taxes and firms’ policy choices.1 Yet, since the asymmetric realization-based tax system
allows investors to defer taxable capital gains and offset capital losses, an investor with
low tax basis (low purchase price relative to current share price), Bill Gates say, faces a
higher effective tax rate and has lower security valuations than the marginal investor.
A number of important questions naturally arise in such a context. First, how does
personal taxation affect corporate investment and leverage choices? In particular, do
firms controlled by shareholders with low tax basis, Microsoft say, pursue different cap-
ital budgeting policies than firms held largely by marginal investors? Second, should
past loser stocks that have experienced tax-loss selling pressure pursue other investment
and financing policies than winner firms? Finally, can tax policy constitute an effective
mechanism to stimulate corporate investment?
Our purpose in this paper is to gain a better understanding of the effects of personal
taxes on firms’ investment and financing decisions by answering these and other related
questions. To do so, we build a dynamic real-options model of the firm in which investors
are subject to both ordinary income taxation and realization-based capital gains taxation
(i.e., capital gains are taxed only when the investor sells the stock). This model yields
an explicit characterization of the optimal investment and financing policies for a firm
acting in the best interests of incumbent shareholders.
The analysis shows that capital gains taxes have two separate, first-order effects on
firms’ policy choices. First, by providing a hedge for poor corporate performance, capital
1Recent contributions (Hennessy and Whited, 2005, Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec, 2006, Strebulaev,
2007) recognize that dynamic tax trade-offs have the potential to generate rich capital structure patterns,
though crucial features of the tax treatment on capital gains are neglected in these models.
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loss offsets drastically erode the value of waiting to invest and restructure – the investment
(timing) effect. Second, firms owned by taxable investors tilt their financing choices
towards equity because of the equity tax shields provided by capital loss offsets – the
financing effect. These effects generalize Miller’s (1977) seminal irrelevancy theorem to
asymmetric capital gain and loss taxation, and have so far not been studied.2
The investment timing effect follows from Bernanke’s (1983) Bad-News Principle. A
standard result in real options theory is that uncertainty and irreversibility give rise to
an option value of waiting so that firms invest only once a project’s rate of return exceeds
the cost of capital by a potentially large option premium. The option value of waiting
arises solely from the desire to avoid bad outcomes, i.e., unprofitable states. Capital loss
offsets increase investors’ after-tax payoffs in states where the firm’s stock price performs
poorly, presumably when operating performance is bad, while leaving payoffs in good
states unaffected (where it is not optimal to sell shares). The asymmetric taxation of
gains (good news) and losses (bad news) limits potential losses, diminishes the option
value of waiting, and leads firms to impose a lower hurdle rate. One direct implication of
this result is that firms owned by taxable investors with high basis overinvest relative to
firms owned by low-basis investors.
The financing effect of capital gains taxation is the result of different security val-
uations across incumbent shareholders and new investors. Since capital gains remain
untaxed until realized, each share entitles taxable investors to an tax timing option.
The value of this tax timing (put) option increases with the tax basis (strike price) of
the investor. As a result, incumbent investors have lower valuations than new investors
whenever the market price exceeds the basis of incumbents (and the marginal investor is
taxable).3 When this is the case, there exists a wedge between the private valuations of
2In Miller’s clientele equilibrium, each leverage ratio is associated with a different clientele of investors
and the value of any firm is independent of its capital structure. This result is fragile, however, as it
requires that investors can trade shares without frictions. Realization-based taxation creates an incentive
to defer gains, locks in incumbent investors, and alters their security valuations. Inevitably the clientele
equilibrium breaks down in the presence of a lock-in effect, precluding investor unanimity. Schneller
(1980), Constantinides (1983), and Hennessy and Whited (2005) also recognize that Miller’s clientele
equilibrium relies crucially on the ability to costlessly trade.
3The key prerequisite that the marginal investor is taxable is supported in the data. See the references
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locked-in incumbents and the market price. Newly issued shares entitle the investors to
at-the-money options granted by the government, while incumbents’ tax-loss selling op-
tions are out-of-the-money. The firm’s current owners can extract this surplus by issuing
equity and thereby diluting their ownership. The surplus is larger when the stock price is
higher or when the owners’ basis is lower. Firms controlled by taxable investors therefore
issue more equity relative to debt the larger their stock price, and firms with low basis,
infra-marginal shareholders are underlevered relative to firms with high-basis, marginal
shareholders. This, in turn, implies that the target leverage ratio is path-dependent, non-
stationary, and inversely related to past performance measures in a way that is consistent
with the empirical evidence.4
To test the predictions of our model, we form a large sample of U.S. industrial firms
that are owned by taxable investors. We restrict our attention to firms that performed
an IPO between 1970 and 2008 and obtain a sample of more than 30,000 firm-year
observations in 5,570 IPOs. Knowing the IPO date and price allows us to study the
model’s implications from a common starting point, to track the tax basis of investors
with reasonable precision, and to make our findings comparable to the recent evidence on
investment dynamics and the evolution of leverage. We first examine the implications of
the model for corporate investment. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we find that
low basis firms invest less than high basis firms, controlling for stock prices and various
firm characteristics known to affect investment. We then examine financing decisions and
find that low basis firms raise more equity than high basis firms and shift their financing
mix towards equity. Finally, we use a powerful difference-in-difference test to show that
the same tax measures that predict policy choices for firms held by individuals do not
predict investment and financing choices for firms held by institutions. The difference in
sensitivity to the basis across tax sensitive and insensitive firms validates that our basis
in Section 2.2 for details. Alternatively, capital gains taxes affect investment and financing decisions when
management has decision rights over the firm’s policy choices (see section 4.5).
4Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that the history of a firm plays a pivotal role in determining capital
structure. Welch (2004) argues capital structure dynamics are dominated by corporate inertia. Other
evidence suggests that capital structures slowly revert back to optimal leverage ratios (Leary and Roberts,
2005). Equity offerings have also been shown to be positively related to stock market performance (see
Masulis and Korwar, 1986, Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996, or Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig, 2005).
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measures proxy for personal tax effects. Overall, the patterns we find in the investment
and financing decisions of our sample firms are supportive of the model’s predictions.
The link between taxes and capital budgeting has been studied extensively, yet exclu-
sively in different contexts. Gordon (1985) shows that taxes do not distort investment if
the reduction in expected returns is compensated by a reduction in systematic risk. This
neutrality result breaks down under an asymmetric tax system with limited offset provi-
sions for tax losses or with realization-based capital gains taxes. Green and Talmor (1985)
find that imperfect corporate tax loss offsets lead to underinvestment. This effect arises
because of the convexity in the tax liability, which induces pseudo risk-averse behavior and
discourages investment. Conversely, we show that the lock-in effect of realization-based
capital gains taxation generates a concavity in after-tax payoffs that fosters pseudo risk-
loving corporate behavior. Finally, Hennessy and Whited (2005), Sundaresan and Wang
(2006), and Lobanov and Strebulaev (2007) study the magnitudes of dynamic investment
and financing distortions due to conflicts of interest between debt- and equityholders,
while this paper focuses on conflicts amongst equityholders with different tax status.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model.
Section 3 solves the model. Section 4 examines the effects of personal taxation on default
risk, corporate investment, and capital structure. Section 5 tests the model’s predictions.
Section 6 concludes. Technical developments are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
Throughout the paper, agents are risk neutral and discount cash flows at a constant after-
tax interest rate r. We consider a firm with assets in place that generate a continuous
flow of pre-tax operating income piXt, where pi ∈ [0, 1] is a constant scaling factor and
X = (Xt)t≥0 is a cash flow shock governed by the process
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt, X0 > 0. (1)
In this equation, µ < r and σ > 0 are constant parameters andW = (Wt)t≥0 is a standard
Brownian motion. In addition to its assets in place, the firm owns a growth option to
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increase capacity and operating income from piX to X. The cost of investment is constant
and denoted by I. The parameter pi determines the growth potential of the firm. The
two extreme values for pi illustrate the nature of the real option. When pi = 0, the firm
owns an investment project and has no assets in place. When pi = 1, the firm has no
growth potential but can reorganize its capital structure at a cost I.
The firm goes public at date t = 0. After the initial round of financing, the firm’s
capital structure consists of n0 = 1 share of common equity and perpetual non-callable
debt with coupon flow c0. To fund the investment project, the firm sells new securities –
an optimal mix of debt and equity. We denote by n1 the number of shares outstanding
after the second round of financing and by c1 the aggregate debt coupon. We assume
that the old and new debt have equal seniority. The tax basis of a given share, i.e., the
price at which it was acquired, is denoted by B. The decision to default is endogenous
and chosen by shareholders.5 Bankruptcy costs consume a fraction α ∈ (0, 1] of the firm’s
capital stock, as in Leland (1994).
Financial markets are frictionless and competitive, and collateralized short-sales are
feasible (section 4.6 examines the effects of transaction costs). The tax code provisions
and the assumptions on the financial markets are borrowed from Constantinides (1983).
Specifically, capital gains are taxed upon realization at the statutory rate τ ≥ 0. Investors
are rational, taxable, and have full use of capital loss offsets.6 The provisions for ordinary
income taxation are standard. The personal tax rates on interest and dividend income are
denoted by τp and τd, respectively. The firm is subject to corporate income taxation at
the rate τ c and distributes its net income as dividends since the double-taxation imposes
a prohibitive cost on internal funds.7 The effective tax rate on ordinary equity income is
τ e = 1− (1− τ c)(1− τd). Coupon payments are tax-deductible with full loss offsets.
5Intermediate funding shortfalls are met through rights issues to existing equityholders, where man-
agement has leeway in setting the subscription price to keep the aggregate tax basis unaffected. In effect
this resembles the deep pocket assumption in Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) and Leland (1998).
6Current IRS rules allow capital losses to cancel out capital gains in the calculation of taxable gains,
if an individual or corporation realizes both gains and losses in the same year. For individuals, if losses
exceed gains in a year, the losses can be claimed as a tax deduction against ordinary income, up to $3,000
per year. Additional net capital loss can be carried forward to the next year and netted out against future
gains. Corporations can carry back capital losses to offset capital gains from prior years.
7For tractability the choice between dividends and share repurchases is not analyzed. While Green
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2.2 Capital gains taxes and the lock-in effect
As shown by Constantinides (1983), realization-based capital gains taxation creates a
lock-in effect for taxable investors that breaks the irrelevancy and unanimity theorems
of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller (1977). Notably, incumbent investors are
reluctant to sell shares with embedded gains and we have the following result (all proofs
are relegated to the Appendix).
Proposition 1 Investors’ optimal trading strategy is to defer capital gains and imme-
diately realize capital losses until the firm defaults on its debt obligations. The default
decision is supported unanimously by equityholders, since all shareholders have rationally
reset their tax basis to zero by the time of default.
The first part of Proposition 1 follows from the fact that capital gains remain untaxed
until the shares are sold. While trading frictions may hamper this strategy in practice,
there is plenty of empirical evidence for tax-induced trading and for the lock-in effect
influencing stock market valuations (see e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000, Ivkovic´,
Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005, and Jin, 2006) – lending support to the model. The
intuition for the second part of the Proposition is as follows. The share price falls as
operating performance deteriorates and default approaches. By selling their shares at a
price p prior to default, equityholders get the after-tax proceeds p−τ(p−B). By contrast,
if they do not engage in tax loss selling, shareholders are left only with a tax credit τB
at the time of default. Since p ≥ 0, shareholders optimally realize losses and reset their
basis values as equity value decreases. Because all shareholders have reset their tax basis
to zero by the time of default, the decision to default is unanimously supported.
and Hollifield (2003) show that repurchases can be more attractive than dividends on a tax basis, the
Internal Revenue Code prohibits firms from disguising dividends in the form of share repurchases (note
also that Feldstein and Summers (1979) show that the failure to index basis for inflation can create capital
gains tax rate over 100%). The Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 302. “Distributions in redemption of stock,”
stipulates that “if a corporation redeems its stock,” such a “redemption shall be treated as a distribution”
if the redemption is “essentially equivalent to a dividend.” Proportionate repurchases, in particular, are
treated the same as dividends for tax purposes. In our model, share repurchases to distribute the firm’s
net income would clearly be proportionate repurchases.
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We show below that while locked-in investors agree on the default decision, they
generally disagree about investment and financing. When determining the firm’s policy
choices, we consider that managers act in the interests of the incumbent shareholders, that
is they maximize private valuations.8 When maximizing shareholder wealth, managers
recognize that the firm’s pool of shareholders changes through time as the stock price
evolves and stockholders reset their basis by selling their shares. In particular, each stock
price path is associated with a different set of shareholders and a different tax basis for
incumbents (and, hence, with different policy choices). It is important to stress that
management’s objective is well-defined and time-consistent. The collateral requirements
introduced above preclude tax-arbitrage (as in Constantinides, 1983). In addition, new
investors are not being expropriated since they rationally anticipate the firm’s decisions
and pay a fair price for the securities they invest in. Key for the results that follow is the
fact that the decision maker is locked-in and thus infra-marginal for pricing.
2.3 Private valuations vs. market prices
The current realization-based tax system implies that capital gains remain untaxed until
realized. As a result, each share entitles investors to a tax timing (put) option with strike
price equal to the tax basis of the investor. The higher is this tax basis, the larger is
the value of the option to realize tax losses. Private valuations therefore differ across
investors, even though all investors receive the same cash distributions. In addition, this
lock-in effect drives a wedge between the private valuations of incumbents and the market
price set by new investors.
To understand the relation between private valuations and market prices and its
implications for capital budgeting, denote by Tu the time of the real option exercise and
8Alternatively, one can think of the manager’s tax basis as the relevant one. This is the case for
example when the manager has decision rights over the firm’s policy choices and is constrained to hold
some stock in the firm. Such liquidity restrictions can be imposed on executives for legal reasons (SEC
Rule 144). They can also be imposed by contract. Kole (1997) documents that the minimum holding
period before any shares can be sold ranges from 31 to 74 months in her sample. For more than a quarter
of the plans the stock cannot be sold before retirement. We investigate this case in Section 4.5.
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by M = (Mt)t≥0 the stopped minimum process associated with X:
Mt = inf0≤s≤min(t,Tu)Xs. (2)
At any date t ≤ Tu, Mt coincides with the worst historical performance for the firm and,
hence, with the threshold at which incumbents’ should sell their shares. Indeed, as shown
in Proposition 1, the optimal trading strategy for taxable investors is to defer gains and
immediately realize losses. As a result, selling is optimal whenever the stock price falls
to a new low. Since the stock price is monotonic in earnings, historical stock price lows
map one-to-one into the running minimum Mt of pre-tax earnings Xt.
Let (x,m) denote realizations of (X,M) in S = {(x,m) ∈ R+ × R+ : x ≥ m} and
define
vi(x,m;B) : Private valuation of a share with tax basis B,
pi(x,m) : Stock price,
Di(x,m) : Market value of the aggregate debt outstanding,
i = 0, 1 : Time period before (0) or after (1) investment.
In addition, denote by bi(m;B) the threshold for pre-tax income that triggers the sale
of a share purchased at basis B. According to Proposition 1, the optimal strategy for
investors is to keep the basis-price ratio from exceeding unity: B ≤ pi(x,m). As a result,
the tax-loss selling threshold bi(m;B) satisfies
pi(bi(m;B),m) = B. (3)
The relation between private valuations and market prices can then be derived as
follows. The competitive clearing condition requires that the market price of any financial
claim is set by new investors (Williams, 1985). Since investors enter with a tax basis equal
to the market price, the market price compounds an at-the-money tax timing option. This
creates the following fixed-point problem linking private valuations to market prices:
pi(x,m) = vi(x,m; pi(x,m)), i = 0, 1, (x,m) ∈ S. (4)
Since private valuations increase with the tax basis of investors, it follows from equations
(3) and (4) that the private valuation of every incumbent is lower than the market price,
i.e., vi(x,m;B) 5 pi(x,m), for all x = bi(m;B). Finally, the valuation of the managerial
decision maker satisfies vi(x,m) ≡ vi(x,m; pi(m,m)), i = 0, 1.
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3 The Firm’s Capital Budgeting Problem
In our model, management makes three types of decisions. First, it selects the firm’s
investment policy, i.e., the investment boundary u(m). Second, it selects the firm’s default
policy, i.e., the default thresholds before and after investment l0(m) and l1(m). Third,
it selects the firm’s financing policy, i.e., the coupon payment and the number of shares
outstanding after the second round of financing c1(m) and n1(m).
When making these policy choices, management acts in the best interests of incumbent
shareholders (see however Section 4.5) and takes into account the dynamics of their tax
basis. As a result, a time-independent trigger strategy is not optimal. Rather, since the
tax basis of shareholders is captured by the running minimum M of the cash flow shock
X, the value-maximizing policy choices depend on both the firm’s current performance,
i.e., Xt = x, and the firm’s historical performance, i.e., Mt = m. Importantly, and as
noted above, managers recognize that the firm’s pool of shareholders changes through
time as the stock price evolves so that the relevant tax basis for corporate decisions is
captured by m. In particular, in our setup the identity of shareholders does not matter.
Whenever the price hits a new low, current investors sell out to a new set of investors
who pick up the new basis so that management only needs to know the firm’s historical
performance to keep track of the basis of incumbents.
Formally, management’s optimization problem can be written as
supu(m),c1(m),n1(m),l0(m),l1(m) v
0(x,m) (5)
subject to the budget constraint
p1(u(m),m)[n1(m)− 1] +D1(u(m),m)−D0(u(m),m) = I, (6)
where (c0, pi, I) are given and m ∈M = {m ∈ R+ : l0 ≤ m ≤ u(m)}.
The objective function in equation (5) represents the private equity valuation of a
representative investor with basis equal to the historical minimum stock price. The
constraint (6) requires the proceeds from issuing n1(m) − 1 new shares and D1 −D0 in
new debt to cover the capital expenditure I > 0. When n1 < 1, the firm repurchases
shares through brokers in the open market. Competitiveness of financial markets requires
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that the offer price of new securities equals their market price after issuance and there is
no price reaction: p0(u(m),m) = p1(u(m),m).
We will solve management’s optimization problem using backward induction, starting
with the valuation of securities after the real option exercise. After investment, equity-
holders receive a cash flow (1 − τ e)(x − c1)/n1 per-share, as long as the firm is solvent.
Therefore, in the region where it is not optimal to default (i.e., for x > l1(m)), private
equity valuations satisfy:
σ2
2
x2v1xx(x,m) + µxv
1
x(x,m) + (1− τ e)(x− c1)/n1 = rv1(x,m). (7)
The right-hand side of equation (7) represents the return required by shareholders on
their investment. The left-hand side represents the expected return, which comes in
the form of changes in private valuation (first two terms) and dividends (third term).
Equityholders may realize capital gains or losses at any time prior to default by selling
their shares in return for after-tax proceeds (1− τ)p1(x,m) + τB. They may also choose
to default on their debt obligations. As a result, equation (7) is solved subject to the
following boundary conditions:
v1(x,m) = (1− τ)p1(x,m) + τB, v1x(x,m) = (1− τ)p1x(x,m) for x = b1(m;B).
v1(x,m) = 0, v1x(x,m) = 0, for x = l
1(m).
(8)
The first line in equation (8) captures the decision to sell the shares. The second line
captures the decision to default. Importantly, Proposition 1 implies that the default
boundary after investment satisfies l1(m) = b1(m; 0) ≤ b1(m;B) for all B ≥ 0. As a
result, the boundary conditions related to the decision to default are subsumed in the
boundary conditions related to the decision to sell shares, and we obtain the limited liabil-
ity conditions p1(l1(m),m) = p1x(l
1(m),m) = 0. Equations (5) and (10) can then be used
to characterize the stock price explicitly in terms of (x,m) (see the Appendix). Finally,
the solution to v1(x,m) = supc1,n1 v1(x,m; p0(m,m)|c1, n1) subject to the constraint (6)
determines the financing structure (c1(m), n1(m)) at the time of investment.
Prior to investment, shareholders receive a cash flow (1−τ e)(pix−c0) and have to make
three types of decisions. First, they may decide to invest at any time prior to default.
Second, they may sell their shares in return for after-tax proceeds (1 − τ)p0(x,m) +
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τp0(m,m). Finally, they may choose to default on their debt obligations. As a result,
the valuation equation corresponding to (5)-(6) is
σ2
2
x2v0xx(x,m) + µxv
0
x(x,m) + (1− τ e)(pix− c0) = rv0(x,m), (9)
which is solved subject to the following value-matching and smooth-fit conditions
v0(x,m) = v1(x,m)− I, v0x(x,m) = v1x(x,m), for x = u(m)
v0(x,m) = 0, v0x(x,m) = 0, for x = m = l
0(m)
v0(x,m) = p0(m,m), v0m(x,m) =
τ
1−τ v
0
x(x,m), for x = m
(10)
The first line in equation (10) determines the endogenous investment boundary u(m).
Shareholders’ limited liability leads to the second pair of value-matching and smooth-fit
conditions in equation (10) and determines the default trigger l0(m). The relevant default
trigger is the one corresponding to a zero tax basis. The last two conditions in equation
(10) come out of the investors’ tax timing problem. For B = p0(m,m), the following
optimality conditions for tax-loss selling hold at x = m:
v0(x,m) = (1− τ)p0(x,m)+ τp0(m,m), v0x(x,m) = (1− τ)[p0x(x,m)+ p0m(x,m)]. (11)
Applying the Envelope Theorem to the first condition in equation (11) and substituting
in the second condition yields the last condition in equation (10).
Figure 1 illustrates the default (L), continuation (C), and investment (U) regions for
the manager’s optimization problem. If x > u(m) the firm invests immediately, and if
x < l0(m) the firm defaults immediately. As a result, the continuation region in which
the firm neither invests nor defaults is defined by C =
{
(x,m) ∈ S : l0(m) ≤ x ≤ u(m)}.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Denote by γ and η the positive and negative roots of the equation 12σ
2y(y−1)−µy−r =
0 and introduce the capitalization factors δ = (1 − τ e)/r and λ = (1 − τ e)/(r − µ). In
addition, denote by ϕ0b the present value of $1 to be received the first time X reaches the
threshold b0(m;B) before the investment trigger u(m). Last, denote by ϕ0u the present
value of $1 to be received the first time that X reaches u(m) before b0(m;B). For
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x ∈ [b0(m;B), u(m)], these state-contingent claims satisfy (see Revuz and Yor, 1999):
ϕ0b(x,m;B) =
x−γu(m)−η − x−ηu(m)−γ
(b0)−γu(m)−η − (b0)−ηu(m)−γ , (12)
ϕ0u(x,m;B) =
x−η(b0)−γ − x−γ(b0)−η
(b0)−γu(m)−η − (b0)−ηu(m)−γ . (13)
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The private valuation of a share with basis B (B ≥ p0(m,m)), respec-
tively before and after investment, satisfies
v0(x,m;B) = λpix− δc0 + ϕ0b(x,m;B)[B − (λpib0(m;B)− δc0)]
+ϕ0u(x,m;B)[v
1(u(m),m;B)− (λpiu(m)− δc0)], (14)
v1(x,m;B) =
λx− δc1
n1
+
(
b1(m;B)
x
)γ [
B − λb
1(m;B)− δc1
n1
]
, (15)
In addition, the share price of equity, respectively before and after investment, satisfies
p0(x,m) =
1
1− τ
[∫ x
m
g(x,m, z)dz + f(x,m)
∫ m
l0
h(m, z)dz
]
, (16)
p1(x,m) =
βλx− δc1
n1
−
(
l1(m)
x
) γ
1−τ
[
βλl1(m)− δc1
n1
]
, (17)
where β = (1+γ)/(1+γ−τ), and the functions f(x,m), g(x,m, z) and h(m, z) are defined
in the Appendix. In these equations, the default threshold that maximizes shareholder
value after investment is given by
l1(m) =
γ
1 + γ
r − µ
r
c1(m). (18)
Proposition 2 shows that private equity valuations have two components – the present
value of dividend distributions and the present value of the stream of capital loss offsets.
Shareholders receive the after-tax flow of dividends (1− τ e)(piXt − c0) before investment
and (1− τ e)(Xt− c1)/n1 per share after investment. Accordingly, the first terms in equa-
tions (14) and (15) are the after income-tax values of the perpetual dividend flow. Once
operating income falls to bi(Mt;B), investors with basis B sell their shares. They receive
after-tax proceeds equal to B per share. The second term in equations (14) and (15)
represents the value of this timing option, including the value of limited liability. The
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third term in equation (14) reflects the value of the real option to invest and restruc-
ture. The value of this option is the product of two terms: the payoff of the option to
invest, v1(u(m),m;B)− (λpiu(m)− δc0), and the stochastic discount factor ϕ0u(x,m;B)
representing the present value of $1 to be received at the time of investment.
Consider next the firm’s stock price. In equation (16), the first integral represents the
after-tax value of dividend income plus the tax loss offsets until operating income falls
to m. The second term captures the present value of the after-tax cash flows starting
at the latter date and ending once shareholders make use of their limited liability. In
equation (17), the first term represents the present value of future cash flows accruing to
shareholders, ignoring the option to default. The second term represents the value of the
option to default. In this equation, the coefficient β captures the effects of capital gains
taxes on prices. In addition, the price of a bankruptcy contingent claim is discounted
due to the fact that investors collect capital loss offsets on the path to bankruptcy. This
effect is captured by the exponent 11−τ .
The value of corporate debt can be derived using a similar approach (see the Appen-
dix). The next proposition gives the value of the corporate debt after investment.
Proposition 3 The market value of aggregate debt after investment (and similarly of the
old and new debt issues with c1 replaced by c0 and c1 − c0, respectively) is
D1(x,m) =
c1(1− τp)
r
[
1− ω
(
l1(m)
x
) γ
1−τ
]
, (19)
where ω ∈ (0, 1) measures the total bankruptcy cost and is defined by
ω = 1− 1− τ
e
1− τp
γ(1− α)
1 + γ − τ . (20)
The value of corporate debt reported in Proposition 3 takes the usual functional form
(see e.g. Leland (1994)). The first factor on the right-hand side of equation (19) represents
the value of risk-free debt. The second factor captures the impact of default risk on the
value of corporate debt. This term incorporates both the loss ω incurred by debtholders
in default and a stochastic discount factor (l1(m)/x)
γ
1−τ that reflects the timing and the
probability of bankruptcy.
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A comparison with some special cases to the general solutions (14)-(19) illustrates
how personal taxes affect private valuations and market prices. When c1 = 0 (n1 = 1)
and τ > 0, the valuations in period 1 coincide with the equations in Constantinides (1983)
for the value of an unlevered firm. The basis reset trigger b1(m;B) equals B/ (βλ) and
v1(x,m;B) = β−1p1(x,m) + (1− β−1)B1+γp1(x,m)−γ , (21)
p1(x,m) = βλx. (22)
When τ = 0, the value of the tax option vanishes and private valuations (14) and (15)
coincide with the share prices (16) and (17). Expressions (15, 17) and (19) collapse to
the values of equity and debt in Leland (1994). The investment trigger u(m) becomes
time-independent. The stock price is independent of m and given by
p0(x,m) = piλx− δc0 − x
−γu−η − u−γx−η
(l0)−γu−η − u−γ(l0)−η
(
piλl0 − δc0) (23)
+
(l0)−γx−η − x−γ(l0)−η
(l0)−γu−η − u−γ(l0)−η
[
p1(u,m)− (piλu− δc0)] ,
p1(x,m) =
[
λx− δc1 − (l1)γx−γ(λl1 − δc1)]/n1. (24)
4 Personal Taxes, Investment, and Financing
This section examines the effects of personal taxes on investment and financing decisions
as well as the properties of the default policy selected by management. It also discusses
the benefits of switching to corporate policy choices that reflect capital gains taxes.
4.1 Distortions in investment policy
A standard result in real options theory is that uncertainty and irreversibility give rise to
an option value of waiting so that firms invest only once a project’s rate of return exceeds
the cost of capital by a potentially large option premium. The option value of waiting
arises solely from the desire to avoid bad outcomes, i.e., unprofitable states. Capital loss
offsets increase investors’ after-tax payoffs in states where the firm’s stock price performs
poorly, presumably when operating performance is bad, while leaving payoffs in good
states unaffected (where it is not optimal for shareholders to sell shares). The asymmetric
taxation of gains (good news) and losses (bad news) limits potential losses and thereby
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diminishes the option value of waiting. This leads firms with high-basis shareholders to
impose a lower hurdle rate – fostering investment.9
This investment stimulus is transitory in nature. When investors reset their tax basis
after stock price declines, the inherent tax asymmetry gradually disappears. The firm’s
optimal response is to raise the hurdle rate for investment any time its shareholders reset.
As a result, the optimal investment threshold shifts up whenever the stock price reaches
a new low. The resulting distortions in corporate investment are substantial since capital
loss offsets kick in when the opportunity cost of investing is the highest.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of personal taxes on the timing of investment. The figure
plots a sample path for the firm’s operating income or, equivalently, the firm’s stock price.
The top line on this figure corresponds to the investment trigger u(m). The bottom line
corresponds to the default trigger l(m). Whenever taxable shareholders realize losses
because of a drop in the stock price below their current basis, the tax basis gets reset
downward as illustrated by the middle line. The optimal response for the firm is to shift
the investment trigger (top line) upward, delaying investment further. As we show below,
the firm also starts using more equity to fund investment.
To examine the quantitative implications of personal taxes for investment and financ-
ing, we need to select values for the parameters of the model. The numerical values for
the parameters r, µ, σ, ω, τ , τ c, τd, τp are summarized in Table 1. They are a consensus
of values found in the literature and in the tax code. Importantly, two opposing views
on the appropriate value for τ e exist in the literature. Miller (1977) argues in a static
setting that, in the absence of a lock-in effect, tax clienteles lead to τ e = τp. By con-
trast, Constantinides (1983) shows in a dynamic setting with realization-based taxation
that a lock-in effect arises because investors have the incentive to minimize their tax bill
9Both the marginal value of exercising the growth option and the marginal value of waiting depend
on the tax basis. At the optimal investment date the marginal value of exercising the option and the
marginal value of waiting must be equal. Inevitably, the investment threshold depends on the tax basis
of the firm’s owners. The effects of the basis on the investment threshold depend on the financial policy.
Optimal financing is sufficient for the investment boundary to be monotonically decreasing in B.
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through the timing of their portfolio trades. The empirical findings in Graham (1999,
2000) support this view and justify τ e > τp.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Table 2 reports comparative statics for the investment trigger u(m) as a function of
stock price performance. Each line in the table represents an alteration of the base case.
Across the different columns the state variable m varies within the interval [l0,m], where
m = sup(m ∈ R+ : u(m) ≥ m), corresponding to basis-price ratios (BPu-ratio) of zero,
one half, and one at the investment date. The second panel in Table 2 characterizes the
investment policy in terms of market-to-book ratios (of equity) at the investment date.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The common feature in all parameter settings is that the investment trigger u(m) shifts
upward as m falls. In the base case environment, u(m) is more than twice as high for
a BPu-ratio of zero compared to a BPu-ratio of one. The table also shows that capital
gains taxes have a large effect on investment decisions when the BPu-ratio is high, since
the hedge provided by capital loss offsets is greater when the basis of incumbents is high.
This effect is illustrated by the left panel of Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
The comparative statics results reported in Table 2 imply that events that cause the
stock price to fall and shareholders to realize losses, such as poor operating performance
or negative macroeconomic shocks, have a long-term impact on capital budgeting deci-
sions. Short-term stock price fluctuations lead to long-term reductions in investment rates
(and leverage ratios). Investment depends positively on past profitability and cash flows,
consistent with the empirical evidence in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) (see also
section 5 below). The corporate inertia documented in Welch (2004) is more pronounced
after poor performance associated with stock price declines (Strebulaev (2007) provides
a rationale for inertia in financing based on the flotation costs of securities).
Another way to look at the investment distortions induced by capital gains taxes is
to examine the hurdle rate for investment. Given the dynamics of the firm cash flows
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in equation (1) and a value u(m) of the cash flow shock at the time of investment, the
internal rate of return on the project HRτ satisfies for an unlevered firm (using equation
(21)):
(1− pi)
{
(1− τ e)u(m)
HRτ − µ + (1− β
−1)B1+γ
[
β
(1− τ e)u(m)
HRτ − µ
]−γ}
= I. (25)
The left-hand side of this equation gives the present value of the cash flows from the
project at the time of investment. The right-hand side gives the cost of investment. By
changing the investment threshold u(m), capital gains taxes change the hurdle rate for
investment HRτ . In the base case environment, the hurdle rate for investment is 50
percent higher for a BPu-ratio of zero compared to a BPu-ratio of one.
4.2 The trade-off theory with personal taxes
The above analysis shows that firms owned by taxable investors with low basis should
underinvest relative to firms owned by high-basis investors. Because of its impact on
private valuations, the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes also has an impact on financing
choices. In particular, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 Firms use more equity to fund their investment project when the tax basis
of their shareholders is lower. That is ∂c1(x|B)/∂B ≥ 0, for any given x and c0.
In the limit as the basis-price ratio approaches one and c0 = 0, the target leverage ratio
in the seasoned offering is given by
Target Leverage =
(1− τp)ϑ[1− ωϑ γ1−τ ]
γ
1+γ−τ [1− τ e + ϑ(τ e − τp)]
, (26)
where ω is defined in Proposition 3 and ϑ satisfies
ϑ =
[
(1− τ)(τ e − τp)
(1 + γ − τ)(τ e − τp) + αγ(1− τ e)
] 1−τ
γ
. (27)
The basic mechanism driving the results in Proposition 4 is a valuation gap between
investors with different tax basis. The ex-ante financing choice balances debt tax shields,
default costs, and the income effect of capital gains taxes, which is just that tax payments,
tax loss offsets and credits are compounded into pre-tax valuations.
17
In the seasoned offering, the target leverage ratio reflects in addition the tax-arbitrage
effect of realization-based capital gains taxation. This personal tax arbitrage arises from
a wedge between the stock price and the private valuations of incumbent investors. Since
the embedded tax timing option is more valuable the larger the investors’ tax basis,
incumbents have lower private valuations than new investors whenever the share price
exceeds the basis of incumbents. This valuation gap generates a surplus when raising
external funds. Every newly issued share entitles new investors to an at-the-money tax
option provided by the government. Issuing equity therefore constitutes a local tax arbi-
trage for incumbent shareholders similar to issuing debt for interest tax shield purposes.10
Since the reservation value of low-basis owners is lower, they extract a larger surplus than
high-basis owners – even though the ownership dilution associated with new equity issues
and the funds raised per share are the same. The firm’s management takes these effects
into account by issuing more equity the larger the stock price-to-basis ratio. As shown
in Proposition 4, this leads to a negative relation between the target leverage ratio and
the price-to-basis ratio.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Table 3 quantifies the cross-sectional variation in ex-post capital structures resulting
purely from personal tax considerations. The table reports both the leverage ratio and
the credit spread at the issuance date. The comparative statics on equity issuance and
the equity-debt mix exhibit the same pattern and are omitted. Input parameter values
for the base case environment are reported in Table 1. Panel A in Table 3 reveals that the
cross-sectional dispersion in target leverage ratios can reach 63 percentage points. In our
base case, firms with shareholders that have a negligible tax basis (e.g., due to prior loss
realizations or little IPO proceeds) have a target leverage of 47.6 percent compared to
64.3 percent for firms with a basis-price ratio of one at the restructuring date. As shown
in Panel B of Table 3 this translates into a yield on corporate debt for the zero-basis firms
that is 62 basis points lower than for the highest basis firms. The table also shows that
10The surplus is equal to the difference between the reservation values of new investors (i.e., the com-
petitive market price) and incumbent shareholders (i.e., private valuations). In competitive markets,
incumbents capture the entire surplus. The surplus also depends on the use of the proceeds since the
value of the timing option is an increasing function of cash flows volatility (see Ross, 1987).
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capital gains taxes have a large effect on financing decisions when the basis-price ratio is
low, since the arbitrage effect of realization-based capital gains taxation is greater when
there is a larger difference between the basis of incumbents and the market price for new
investors. This effect is illustrated by the right panel of Figure 3.
4.3 Capital gains taxes and the timing of default
When the decision to default is endogenous, the timing of default depends on the default
threshold selected by management. Figure 4 plots the firm’s default boundary before
(solid) and after (dashed) exercise of the real option in separate panels for different
parameter values. The figure shows that after investment (see also Proposition 3), the
default threshold l1 does not depend on the capital gains tax rate τ . The intuition for this
result is that shareholders have reset their tax basis to nil by the time of default. Once
the basis is zero, valuations are independent of the capital gains tax rate (this can be seen
by setting B = 0 in equation (15)). As a result, the default threshold l1 is independent
of τ .
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
Before investment, the default threshold reflects not only the trade-off between the
continuation value of assets in place and the firm’s debt obligations but also the impact of
the decision to default on the value of the firm’s growth option. In this respect, our paper
is related to the papers by Sundaresan and Wang (2006) and Lobanov and Strebulaev
(2007), in which the default threshold before investment reflects the real option value of
waiting. The comparative statics reveal that the default boundary before investment lies
well below the corresponding value after investment because the loss of a valuable in-
vestment opportunity discourages shareholders from declaring bankruptcy. Importantly,
since capital gains taxes affect the investment threshold u(m), the default threshold prior
to investment indirectly reflects the tax status of the firm’s shareholders and, therefore,
depends on the capital gains tax rate τ and the personal income tax rates τp, τd.
4.4 The relevance of personal taxes to capital budgeting
The analysis reported above shows that the distortions in investment and financing poli-
cies induced by capital gains taxes are economically significant. One question that natu-
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rally arises is whether they are also economically relevant. We can answer this question
by examining the change in value created by a switch from time-independent investment
and financial policies to path-dependent policies. This change in value is reported in Ta-
ble 4. The numbers reported in the table are computed at the market value maximizing
trigger and, thus, measure the opportunity cost of maximizing the stock price.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
As shown in Table 4, the benefit from switching to the path-dependent policy in the base
case environment can represent up to 3.4% of firm value, depending on the owners’ tax
basis. For a basis equal to the stock price the two policies are identical, offering no gains.
They differ the most for a basis-price ratio of zero, offering the largest gains. For capital
restructurings the optimal policy yields a 5.6% value gain (when pi ≈ 100%). Across
parametrizations the improvement in value reaches up to 14.2%.
4.5 Managerial discretion and capital gains taxes
So far we have assumed that the objective of management was to maximize the private
valuations of shareholders. Assume now that the manager does not act in the best interest
of shareholders so that the relevant tax basis is the manager’s tax basis. Let us denote by
B this tax basis and consider, as in Zwiebel (1996) and Morellec (2004), that management
has discretion over investment and financing policies. In this case, the optimization
problem of the manager is similar to (7)-(10) with B replacing m everywhere.11 The
solution to this optimization problem can then be derived using the same steps as above.
11In the United States, wash-sale rules prevent shareholders from selling a stock and repurchasing the
same stock within 30 days (otherwise the tax-loss credit is lost). This implies that in our setting the
manager loses control for 30 days. To see whether wash-sale rules can have an impact on the policy
choices of management, we can compute the probability that a restructuring occurs within 30 days of a
stock sale. An upper bound for this probability (that should take into account the fact that u(m) goes
up as the state variable goes down) is given by the probability of reaching the threshold u(m) starting
from b0(m;B) over a 30-day period:
P
(
sup
0≤t≤T
Xt ≥ u(m)
)
= N
[− ln (u(m)/b(m;B)) + µST
σ
√
T
]
+
(
u(m)
b(m;B)
) 2µS
σ2 N
[− ln (u(m)/b(m;B))− µST
σ
√
T
]
,
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Table 5 compares the investment and financing policies selected by the manager with
the policies that would be selected if the manager’s tax basis was ignored. The table
reports the change in investment policy, the change in the firm’s target leverage ratio,
and the improvement in private valuations associated with policy choices that reflect the
tax basis of the manager.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
The results reported in Table 5 are similar to those reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Specif-
ically, Table 5 shows that managerial discretion leads to an increase in the investment
threshold and to a decrease in the leverage ratio. The benefit for the manager of switching
to a policy reflecting his tax basis ranges between 0.2% and 6.7% of private valuations.
4.6 The effects of trading frictions
The analysis so far has ignored the effects of trading frictions (such as transaction costs)
on shareholders’ incentives to sell their shares and reset their basis following capital gains
losses. Arguably, these frictions may have an impact on the value-maximizing policy
choices in the presence of capital gains taxes.
To investigate this issue, we consider four alternative environments. In the first en-
vironment, we assume that the manager cannot trade at any point in time (due to re-
strictions in his compensation contract) so that the only effect of capital gains taxes is
to provide a tax credit to the decision maker at the time of default. By contrast new
investors are allowed to trade as in the baseline model so that the dynamics of asset
prices are unaffected by the trading restriction faced by the manager. In the second envi-
ronment, we consider as in Liu and Loewenstein (2008) that when shareholders want to
sell their shares, they can sell their stock at the price piT (x,m) = (1 − ρ)pi(x,m) where
ρ = c(1 − B/pi(x,m)) with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 represents the transaction cost rate. In this
case, the optimization problem of the decision maker is similar to (7)-(10) with piT (x,m)
replacing pi(x,m) everywhere. In the third environment, we consider that neither the
manager nor shareholders can trade. Finally, we consider in the fourth environment that
where T = 1/12, µS = µ− σ2/2, and N is the Standard Normal CDF. When the basis-price ratio of the
manager is 0.5, the probability of investment over 30 days is less than 1% if the volatility of cash flows σ is
lower than 75%, showing that wash-sale rules should have little impact on management’s policy choices.
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both the manager and shareholders can trade at a cost.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Panels A, B, C, and D of Table 6 report the firm’s investment trigger and target
leverage ratio for environments 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. In panels B and D, we calibrate
the value of c in such a way that we get a reduction in the stock price equivalent to the
illiquidity discount computed by Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang, 2006, or Liu and Lowenstein,
2008, for a proportional transaction cost rate of 1% (as documented in Ang and Bekaert,
2002). The results reported in Table 6 are similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3. In
particular, the table shows that in each environment the selected investment threshold
decreases and the firm’s target leverage ratio increases with the basis-price ratio. This
suggests that trading frictions have no qualitative and small quantitative effects on the
firm’s policy choices.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section we test the predictions of the model regarding corporate investment and
financing policies using a powerful difference-in-difference strategy for a large sample of
US industrial firms that are owned by taxable investors. The main prediction from our
model for corporate investment is that firms owned by taxable investors with low basis
underinvest compared to high-basis firms, all else equal. As a result, we expect to observe
a positive relation between corporate investment and the tax basis of investors, controlling
for other factors that are known to affect investment. Similarly, the main prediction from
the model for corporate financing is that firms owned by low-basis investors use more
equity financing to fund investment compared to high-basis firms. Personal taxes are
levied on the income reported by individual investors (and firms) only. Many institutional
investors are tax-exempt. We therefore expect the tax basis to be irrelevant for corporate
decisions when firms are held largely by tax exempt investors.
A simple test of personal tax effects can be constructed by looking at whether share-
holders’ tax basis has significant bearing on investment and financing decisions. The
caveat is that the tax basis, while known to investors, is not directly observable. In
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our empirical analysis, we therefore resort to reasonable proxies for the tax basis and
check for robustness. We find that our various proxies for investors’ tax basis have eco-
nomically and statistically significant explanatory power for corporate investment and
financing. Overall, our empirical analysis provides new evidence on corporate investment
and financing decisions that is strongly supportive of the model’s predictions.
5.1 Data and sample construction
Our main sample consists of all COMPUSTAT firms for which data on the IPO date
and offer price are available. Knowing the IPO date and price allows us to study the
implications of the model from a common starting point, to track the tax basis of investors
with reasonable precision, and to make our findings comparable to the recent evidence on
investment dynamics and the evolution of leverage. The initial sample consists of all IPOs
between January 1, 1970, and March 31, 2008, reported by the Securities Data Company
(SDC, now owned by Thomson Reuters). Following the literature, we exclude from the
sample spinoffs, unit offers, financial firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, and
public administration with SIC codes between 9000 and 9999. Firms are included in the
sample until 15 years after the IPO or until they exit COMPUSTAT. The data end with
fiscal year 2007. (For consistency with prior studies, we have also investigated the sample
restricted to end with fiscal year 2002. We have obtained the same results.)
The construction of the dependent and explanatory variables follows the literature.
Total assets, A, are given by COMPUSTAT Annual Item 6. Book debt, D, is defined as
total liabilities (Item 181) and preferred stock (Item 10, replaced by the redemption value
of preferred stock (Item 56) when missing) minus deferred taxes (Item 35) and convertible
debt (Item 79). Book equity, E, is total assets minus book debt. Book leverage, D/A,
is defined as book debt divided by total assets. Market-to-book ratio, M/B, is book
debt plus market equity (common shares outstanding (Item 25) times share price (Item
199)) divided by total assets. Market-to-book ratios larger than ten are eliminated for
consistency with prior studies. The external finance weighted-average market-to-book
ratio, M/Befwa, is defined as in Baker and Wurgler (2002, equation (3)).
Investment denotes capital expenditures during the fiscal year (Item 128) normalized
by total assets A at the beginning of the fiscal year. Net equity issues, Equity Issuance, is
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the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings (Item 36) normalized by
total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. Profitability is measured by EBITDA/A,
which is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item 13) divided by fiscal
year-end total assets. Size is the logarithm of net sales (Item 12). Asset tangibility,
Tangibility, is defined as net plant, property, and equipment (Item 8) over total assets.
R&D is research and development expense (Item 46, replaced by zero when missing) over
total assets. A dummy variable, RDD, takes the value of one when Item 46 is missing and
zero otherwise. In the analysis that follows, we lag all explanatory variables by one fiscal
year. Firm-year observations that are outliers with regard to various firm characteristics
are adjusted for by winsorizing the data at .5% and 99.5%. Our final sample consists of
more than 30,000 firm-year observations in 5,570 IPOs.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
Panel A of Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the firm characteristics and
corporate decisions. All variables except M/B and Size are expressed in percentage
terms. We define the IPO year as the fiscal year in which the IPO takes place. Year IPO+k
is then the kth fiscal year after the IPO. The patterns displayed in Table 7 are consistent
with the findings in previous studies. Investment and issuance activity decline with age.
The financing mix is relatively stable. Size increases with age, whereas the market-to-
book ratio decreases over time. Cash flows and profitability decline substantially over the
two years following the IPO year, and strongly increase thereafter. Last, the individual
ownership share slightly increases with firm age.
5.2 Proxies for investors’ tax basis
The tax basis of shareholders is not directly observable. We therefore construct proxies
for the tax basis of incumbents using information on the IPO offer price (typically a large
portion of the float is purchased at this price so that the initial tax basis equals the IPO
offer price), the evolution of the stock price in financial markets after the IPO, the share
volume and stock turnover, and the tax-relevant changes to the float, such as stock splits
and reverse splits. The history of price and transaction volume information on the firms’
common shares and the number of shares outstanding at each point in time are obtained
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from CRSP. The number of outstanding shares are then used to compute measures of
share turnover. When computing the tax basis, we adjust stock prices for stock splits
using the adjustment factors provided by CRSP.
The most natural proxy for shareholders’ tax basis given the model described in
section 2 is the running minimum of the stock price (as in Constantinides, 1983):
Bt = min(PIPO, min
s=1,2,...,t
Ps), (28)
where PIPO is the IPO offer price and Pt denotes the secondary market price at date t
after the IPO. We use equation (28) to construct our basic measure (which corresponds
to Constantinides’ frictionless trading model). The measure for embedded capital gains
used in Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang (2008), i.e., the stock price appreciation
over the past two years, is similar to the price-basis ratio constructed from our measure
but neglects transitory price drops.
An alternative to the model described above is the proportional trading model of
Lewellen and Lewellen (2006), which assumes that all investors holding stock are equally
likely to trade, regardless of tax status, time of purchase, and market conditions. Under
this assumption, we can infer tax-induced trading from observed trading volume and
recursively estimate the firm’s tax basis using aggregate trading volume data, given an
estimate of the initial tax basis. Lewellen and Lewellen (LL, 2006), however, acknowledge
that proportional trading may constitute an overly restrictive and probably inaccurate
assumption. It is generally agreed that long-term investors that are active in corporate
governance trade less often than short-term speculators and, hence, make up a small
fraction of share turnover at normal times. Aggregate trading volume thus may constitute
a poor proxy for trading by tax sensitive investors.
To reconcile the two extreme views about trading activity by taxable investors, we
allow the (trading) hazard rates of short- and long-term investors to vary across market
conditions. Adopting the recursive formulation in LL (2006) one can write the basis at
time t as:
Bt = Pt ∗ wt +Bt−1 ∗ (1− wt), (29)
where wt is a weight that is time- and stock-specific. We set the initial basis to PIPO. The
weights wt depend on our assumption about the composition of trading amongst short-
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term and long-term investors in up and down markets. (The measure used by Grinblatt
and Han, 2005, is similar to ours but sets the initial basis to the trading price five years
before the current date – so that the two measures perfectly coincide any date between
the IPO and IPO+5 years but differ afterwards).
Our basic model (equation (28)) neglects any information contained in aggregate
volume and sets wt = 1 if the stock price goes down and wt = 0 otherwise. Our alternative
tax basis proxies are defined as follows. First, to capture trading frictions, we assume
that shareholders do not reset the tax basis instantly but slowly and in proportion with
all investors (Basis proxy II). The proportional trading assumption then holds only on the
way down, corresponding to wt = Turnovert−1,t if the stock price goes down and wt = 0
otherwise. In this specification, Turnovert−1,t is defined as shares traded between date
t−1 and t divided by the number of shares outstanding. We cap turnover at 100% of shares
outstanding so that the weights are between zero and one. Second, to capture trading
frictions and tax-unrelated trading, we define Basis proxy III using the following weights:
wt = .5 ∗ (1 + Turnovert−1,t) if the stock price goes down and wt = .5 ∗ Turnovert−1,t
otherwise (we have used other specifications with the same results).
To summarize, we construct the following set of proxies for shareholders’ tax basis:
• Proxy I: wt = 1 if the stock price goes down and 0 otherwise.
• Proxy II: wt = Turnovert−1,t if the stock price goes down and 0 otherwise.
• Proxy III: wt = .5 ∗ (1 + Turnovert−1,t) if the stock price goes down and .5 ∗
Turnovert−1,t otherwise.
In each specification, we normalize the tax basis cross-sectionally by dividing through by
the IPO offer price. Thus, the explanatory variable used in the analysis is defined as Tax
Basis/Ot = Bt/PIPO. Similarly, we define the explanatory variable Stock Price/Ot as
the share price at date t, Pt, divided by the IPO offer price. Panel B of Table 7 provides
descriptive statistics on the various tax basis proxies used in the empirical analysis.
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5.3 Do personal taxes affect corporate investment?
To examine the effects of capital gains taxes on corporate investment, we augment
standard investment regressions with our tax basis proxy. The dependent variable,
Investmentt, is the total investment during the fiscal year t− 1 through t normalized by
beginning of-the-year assets. In these regressions, we use the components of the basis-
price ratio, lagged one year, as explanatory variable instead of using the basis-price ratio.
The reason is that the stock price contains information about investment opportuni-
ties. Separating the basis-price ratio into basis and price component, both appropriately
normalized, provides us with a cleaner proxy for tax effects. In the robustness checks
(Panel B), we use the basis-price ratio, Basis-Price Ratiot−1, as explanatory variable.
We obtain similar results. Dropping the price component also does not affect the results.
When running these regressions, we are interested in determining whether the in-
vestors’ tax basis, expressed in percent of the respective IPO offer price, is a determinant
of investment when controlling for the current (normalized) stock price and other firm
characteristics that are known to affect corporate investment. The set of regressions we
perform is of the following form:
Investmentt = c0 + c1Tax Basis/Ot−1 + c2Stock Price/Ot−1
+ c3M/Bt−1 + c4CFt−1 + c5Tangibilityt−1 + c6Sizet−1
+ c7Profitabilityt−1 + c8R&Dt−1 + c9RDDt−1 + t. (30)
In this regression, we expect a positive coefficient c1, implying that high basis firms in-
vest more than low basis firms. Table 8 reports the results. The regressions in Panel A are
estimated with firm fixed effects. We adjust standard errors for clustering at the industry
level defined by three-digit SIC codes (as suggested by Petersen, 2008). The coefficients
on M/Bt−1, CFt−1, Tangibilityt−1, Sizet−1, Profitabilityt−1, R&Dt−1, and RDDt−1
are as expected and consistent with prior studies. The coefficient c1 on Tax Basist−1 is
positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with our hypothesis that low basis
firms should underinvest relative to high basis firms.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
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In panel B, we perform a number of robustness checks. First, we estimate the regres-
sions with random effects or using instrumental variables and fixed effects.The coefficient
c1 is again positive and significant. In this panel, we also replace Tax Basist−1 and Stock
Pricet−1 by their ratio Basis-Price Ratiot−1, so that we do not estimate separately c1
and c2. The results we obtain are generally consistent with Panel A. Notably, the coeffi-
cient c1 on Basis-Price Ratiot−1 is typically positive and significant (the only exception
is for basis proxy II). Taken together, this first round of results provides evidence that
the tax basis of investors has a systematic effect on corporate investment.
Another way to test our model is to investigate the impact of the shareholders’ tax
basis on the probability of large corporate investments, defined as P (Investmentt ≥ Î)
where Î represents the threshold for large investments (Panel C: Logit analysis). For
this analysis, we need to define “large” investments. We define the threshold Î for large
investments as the average industry investment rate in the sample (similar results are
obtained if we use instead the median investment rate). The specifications are estimated
with fixed or random effects. The significant positive coefficient on the tax basis (except
for basis proxy III) suggests again that high basis firms are more likely to conduct real
investments, consistent with the model’s prediction.
5.4 Proxies for tax sensitive stock ownership
Capital gains taxes apply to income reported by individual investors on their personal tax
filings. This includes capital gains from the selling of shares held by individuals directly
and shares held indirectly in flow-through entities such as mutual funds, partnerships,
trusts, and limited liability corporations that pass-through dividend income. Capital
gains taxes are not levied on tax-deferred accounts in qualified retirement plans (i.e.,
pension, IRA, 401k). Tax-exempt organizations including pension funds, universities,
charities, and other non-profits (plus foreigners) also do not pay capital gains taxes,
while corporations do pay capital gains taxes.
If our proxy for shareholders’ tax basis indeed captures personal tax effects, we should
expect the significance of c1 to disappear when restricting the sample to firms for which
personal taxes are irrelevant due to their ownership structure. To test this hypothesis,
we construct proxies for the ownership share of a company by tax sensitive investors
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using data on shares held by institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding.12
Data on ownership shares are obtained from quarterly filings by registered investment
management companies and professional money managers with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission on Form 13f (known as CDA/Spectrum S34 data and provided
through Thomson Reuters).13 The data identifies the type of institutional manager using
broad categories.14 The types of investment companies that are required to file with the
SEC (often called 13f institutions) include banks, insurance companies, parents of mutual
funds, pension funds, university endowments, and numerous other types of professional
investment advisors. When measuring institutional ownership, we employ information
on shares outstanding provided by Thomson, while we use the CRSP data for measuring
turnover, since the data can be recorded at different times and for consistency within
data base. The two measures differ by less than ten percent in 90 percent of cases.
Following Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang (2008), we measure both direct and
total holdings by individual investors and compute two measures of the tax sensitive
ownership on a stock at any point in time:
12Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang (2008) and Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2003), among
others, have previously used institutional holdings to determine the fraction of shares held by individuals.
An alternative source of information on tax sensitive holdings are the insider filings with the SEC as
reported on Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144. Insider holdings are often subject to holding period restrictions and
trading blackout periods. We have therefore opted to focus on holdings by all individuals.
13Under Securities Exchange Act Section 3(a)(9) and Section 13(f)(5)(A), an institutional investment
manager is an entity that either invests in, or buys and sells, securities for its own account; or a natural
person or an entity that exercises investment discretion over the account of any other natural person or
entity. Currently, only managers with over $100 million under their control are required to file, but others
may still do so and be included in the CDA/Spectrum S34 data set. Other cases where holdings are
not reported include cases with confidentiality issues and holdings that can not be matched to a master
security file. Cases where two or more managers share control are counted only once (the SEC requires
only one of the managers to report holdings information in their 13f reports). These rules and regulations
imply that equity holdings by institutions that are not captured include small holdings under 10,000
shares or $200,000 and all holdings by managers controlling less than $100 million if they choose not to
report under Securities Exchange Act Section 3(a)(9) and Section 13(f)(5)(A).
14The Thomson type code identifying institutional managers as banks, insurance companies, investment
companies, and independent investment advisors reflects a known mapping error in 1998 and beyond. We
try to mitigate the classification error by searching over the entire database prior to 1998 and imputing
the type code for the improperly classified institutions after 1997.
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• Direct individual ownership = Shares outstanding minus total institutional holdings
(Thomson type codes 1-5), divided by shares outstanding.
• Total individual ownership = Direct individual holdings plus holdings by mutual
funds (Thomson type code 3), divided by shares outstanding.
Table 9 reports the results when we estimate the basic investment regression sepa-
rately for firms owned predominantly by individual investors or institutional investors,
respectively. For this purpose, we split the sample into firms with 80% or more, 50% to
80%, and less than 50% individual ownership. Each column corresponds to an ownership
cluster. Panel A splits the sample of firms by the portion of stock held by individual
investors directly or through mutual funds. Panel B splits the sample of firms by the por-
tion of stock held directly by individual investors. In the second part of each panel, we
report the coefficients on Basis-Price Ratiot−1 in regressions that replace Tax Basist−1
and Stock Pricet−1 by their ratio. (Since the holdings data only starts in the first quarter
of 1980, we have to restrict the IPO sample.)
[Insert Table 9 Here]
The general pattern, which is robust across specification, is that the coefficient on the
tax basis is large and significant for firms held by individuals but small and insignificant
for firms held by institutions. This suggests that the tax basis is (not) a determinant of
tax (in)sensitive firms.
5.5 Do personal taxes affect external financing?
In addition to its implications for corporate investment, the model also has implications
for external financing and the firm’s equity-debt mix. The main prediction of the model
for corporate financing is that firms owned by investors with low basis use more equity
financing to fund investment than high-basis firms. We test this hypothesis using similar
difference-in-difference techniques as in the previous section.
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The basic regression we run is of the following form:
Yt = c0 + c1Tax Basis/Ot−1 + c2Stock Price/Ot−1 + c3M/Bt−1
+ c4M/B
efwa
t−1 + c5CFt−1 + c6Tangibilityt−1 + c7Sizet−1
+ c8Profitabilityt−1 + c9R&Dt−1 + c10RDDt−1 + t. (31)
In this specification, the dependent variable Yt is equal to the change in book equity net
of the change in retained earnings during the financial year t − 1 through t divided by
year-end assets in the IPO year, denoted Equity Issuancet. We expect the coefficient on
the tax basis to be negative. In the robustness checks (Panel C), we use an alternative
dependent variable, Equity-Debt Mixt, which is defined as the portion of external funds
raised in the form of equity during the financial year.
[Insert Table 10 Here]
Table 10 summarizes the results. The regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects
(similar results are obtained in the robustness checks that use random effects). Standard
errors are robust to clustering at the industry level defined by three-digit SIC codes and
reported in parentheses. The significant negative coefficients on shareholders’ tax basis
support the hypothesis that low basis firms issue more equity than high basis firms.
In Panel B, we report the corresponding coefficients when we replace Tax Basist−1
and Stock Pricet−1 by their ratio Basis-Price Ratiot−1, with same interpretation. In
another robustness check (Panel C), we replace Equity Issuancet by Equity-Debt Mixt.
The negative coefficient we obtain implies that low basis firms tilt their financing mix
towards equity, consistent with the predictions of the model.
[Insert Table 11 Here]
As in the analysis of investment, we expect the magnitude and significance of the co-
efficient c1 on the tax basis to drop in financing regressions when we restrict the sample
to tax insensitive firms. Table 11 reports the results when we estimate the financing re-
gression separately for firms owned predominantly by individual investors or institutional
investors, respectively. For this purpose we again split the sample into firms with 80% or
more, 50%-80%, and less than 50% individual ownership. Each column corresponds to
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an ownership cluster. In Panel A, we split the sample using total individual ownership.
In Panel B, we split the sample using direct individual ownership. The general pattern is
that the coefficient on the tax basis is large and significant for firms held by individuals
but small and insignificant for firms held by institutions. This result is robust to the basis
proxy employed to conduct the analysis. The evidence suggests that a drop in tax basis
leads to more equity financing only for firms owned by tax sensitive investors.
5.6 Managerial shareholdings and firms’ policy choices
To make the analysis complete, this section examines whether the tax basis of manage-
ment has an effect on firms’ investment and financing decisions. To do so, we repeat
the analysis conducted above for corporate investment, equity issuance, and the portion
of external funds raised in the form of equity using management’s tax basis, lagged one
year, as explanatory variable.
We use two different methods to compute management’s tax basis. First, we compute
the ownership-weighted average basis of all insiders that are required to file SEC form
3, 4, and 5 when they trade in their companies’ stock – management’s basis proxy I.
The types of insiders we include (based on the TFN insider role code) are CEO, CFO,
COO, chairman of the board (CB), officer (O), director (D), and president (P). Second,
we compute the ownership-weighted average basis of the CEO, CFO, and chairman of
the board (CB) – management’s basis proxy II.
In computing holdings, we follow Thomson Reuter’s instructions and take the direct
holdings with the highest sequence number on a document control number. We also ex-
clude duplicate records and any records with cleanse code ‘A’ or ‘S’ for quality issues.
Since the Thomson data on holdings is difficult to reconcile with the data on individual
transactions, we use for consistency the holdings data to compute both the ownership
share and the evolution of the insiders’ average tax basis. We use the Thomson transac-
tions data, augmented by CRSP stock price data, to determine the transaction date and
price of insiders’ stock purchases (and sales).
Based on the history of holdings, we compute each insider’s tax basis as follows. The
initial tax basis equals the stock price at the date the initial holdings are reported on Form
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3 or, if that is missing, the date of the first transaction. If the insider reduces his ownership
share in a given period, the basis of the remaining shares (being the relevant forward
looking quantity) equals the basis of the retained shares, that is Basist = Basist−1. By
contrast, if the insider is a net buyer of shares, we compute the new tax basis as the
weighted-average of the basis on the old shares and the purchase price of the new shares:
Basist = Pt ∗ wt +Basist−1 ∗ (1− wt), where wt = Net purchasest/Shares heldt.15
According to the model, investment should be positively related and equity financing
should be negatively related to management’s tax basis (see section 4.5). We test these
hypotheses using similar difference-in-difference techniques as in the previous section.
The basic regression we run is of the following form:
Yt = c0 + c1Management Basis/Ot−1 + c2Price/Ot−1 + c3M/Bt−1
+ c4M/B
efwa
t−1 + c5CFt−1 + c6Tangibilityt−1 + c7Sizet−1
+ c8Profitabilityt−1 + c9R&Dt−1 + c10RDDt−1 + c11BDt−1 + t. (32)
In this specification, the variable Yt is equal to Investmentt, to Equity Issuancet, or to
Equity-Debt Mixt, where these quantities are defined as above. The model is estimated
with dummy variables for missing information on management’s stock holdings, BDt−1,
since a sizeable fraction of ownership data is missing. In the first regression, we expect
the coefficient on management’s tax basis to be positive. In the other two regressions, we
expect the coefficient on the tax basis to be negative.
[Insert Table 12 Here]
Table 12 summarizes the results (the coefficients on the constant and on the dummy
variables for missing data are not reported). Standard errors are robust to clustering
at the industry level defined by three-digit SIC codes and reported in parentheses. The
15The weighted-average method ignores tax incentives to sell securities from tax lots with the highest
basis first (called “Highest In, First Out,” or HIFO method). While the Internal Revenue Service does not
recognize HIFO as an accounting method, it recognizes specific-shares accounting for reporting investment
gains. According to IRS rules, if an investor does not indicate specific shares to sell, all gains and losses
calculations automatically default to the “First In, First Out” method, meaning oldest purchases are sold
first. Investment banks, however, often advise clients to sell securities using specific-share accounting with
the HIFO method to lower capital gains taxes (and provide brokerage tools that assist with tracking).
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regressions in Panel A are estimated with firm fixed effects. The positive coefficient on
management’s tax basis in the first regression supports the hypothesis that low basis
firms underinvest relative to high-basis firms. Similarly, the negative coefficient on man-
agement’s tax basis in the other two regressions supports the hypothesis that low basis
firms issue more equity than high basis firms and tilt their financing mix towards equity.
In panel B, we estimate the regressions using fixed effects and instrumental variables or
with random effects. The coefficient c1 is again positive and significant in the first regres-
sion and negative and significant in the other two regressions. Overall, the results using
management’s tax basis are consistent with the findings using individual ownership.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that personal taxes can cause large distortions in corporate capital
budgeting decisions. Specifically, we show that the hedge provided by capital loss off-
sets diminishes the option value of waiting to invest so that firms controlled by taxable
investors speed up investment. We also show that capital gains taxes drive a wedge be-
tween the private valuations of the firm’s incumbent owners and the market price and,
as a result, distort financing choices. In particular, the analysis in the paper reveals that
firms controlled by taxable investors employ more equity financing, the higher the firm’s
stock price and the lower the owners’ basis, i.e., the larger the stock price-to-basis ratio.
The paper also provides supportive evidence for the predictions of the model using a
broad sample of US industrial firms that are owned by taxable investors. Specifically, we
find that our various proxies for investors’ tax basis have economically and statistically
significant explanatory power for corporate investment and financing in the way predicted
by the model. Low basis firms invest less than high basis firms, controlling for various
firm characteristics known to affect corporate financial policy. Low basis firms also raise
more equity than high basis firms and shift their financing mix towards equity. We then
show that the same tax measures that predict policy choices for firms held by individuals
do not predict investment and financing choices for firms held by institutions.
34
Appendix
A Proof of proposition 1
Constantinides (1983, Theorem 1) provides the proof in the case with no leverage. Con-
sider the case with leverage. The optimality conditions for selling a share with basis
B ≥ 0 at cash-flow trigger b(m;B) and, respectively, for defaulting at l(m) when the
decision maker’s basis is B ≥ 0 are
vx(b(m;B);B) = (1− τ)px(b(m;B)) (≥ 0), (A.1)
vx(l(m);B) = 0. (A.2)
Absence of arbitrage requires px(x) ≥ 0 for all feasible x, so the right-hand side of equation
(A.1) is positive. The left-hand side, vx(x;B), is continuous in x, and the process X =
(Xt)t≥0 has continuous sample paths. Hence, condition (A.1) yields b(m;B1) ≤ b(m;B2)
for B1 ≤ B2, and the comparison with equation (A.2) yields l(m) ≤ b(m;B) for all B ≥ 0.
This shows that shareholders optimally reset their tax basis before declaring bankruptcy,
or in terms of the trigger policies:
l(m) = b(m; 0) ≤ b(m;B) for all B ≥ 0 and m ∈M. (A.3)
B Proof of propositions 2 and 3
Take as given the firm’s policy functions, (u(m), c1(m), n1(m), l0(m), l1(m)), and drop
the dependence of m where obvious.
Private equity valuation v1(x,m;B): The solution to equations (7, 8) is standard.
See, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton University
Press).
Stock price p1(x,m): The stock price p1(x,m) is given implicitly as the fixed-point
to equation (4). To determine the stock price explicitly we use condition (3) and the
optimality conditions (8) for tax-loss selling and for default. Conditions (8) hold for
arbitrary B ≥ 0 and so for arbitrary b1(m;B) ≥ l1(m), since by equation (3) there is
a one-to-one mapping between B and b1(m;B). Rearranging terms, p1(x,m) solves the
following first-order differential equation in terms of x given l1(m) for all m ∈M :
p1x(x,m) =
1
1− τ v
1
x(x,m; p
1(x,m)) for x > l1(m), p1(l1(m),m) = 0, p1x(l
1(m),m) = 0.
(B.1)
The solution to equation (B.1) is given by equation (17).
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Default Trigger l1(m): Using equation (15), we have v1x(x,m; 0) =
λ
n1
[1+γ( l
1
x )
γ(λl
1−δc1
λx )].
The smooth-pasting condition v1x(l
1(m),m; 0) = 0 then yields the trigger (18).
Debt value D1(x,m): Debtholders in aggregate receive after-tax coupon flows c1(1−
τp) while the firm is solvent and 1−α per cent of the value of the unlevered assets, βλx,
when the firm enters default (as in Leland, 1994). Holders of risky debt can also claim
capital loss offsets (in the same way as equityholders). The private debt valuation given
basis D is thus D1(x,m;D) = 1−τ
p
r c
1 + (d
1(m;D)
x )
γ [D − 1−τpr c1], where d1(m;D) is the
basis-reset trigger. The market price D1(x,m) satisfies a differential equation similar to
equation (B.1):
D1x(x,m) =
1
1− τ D
1
x(x,m;D
1(x,m)) for x > l1(m),
D1(l1(m),m) = (1− α)V ∗(l1(m)), lim
x→∞D
1(x,m) =
c1(1− τp)
r
.
(B.2)
The last condition in equation (B.2) requires that debt becomes riskless as x→∞. Since
all debt issues, by assumption, have the same priority and recovery rate in the event of
bankruptcy, it is sufficient to value the aggregate debt. The solution to equation (B.2) is
equation (19).
Optimal static leverage ratio: The market value of the unlevered firm V ∗ in equation
(B.2) takes the simple form V ∗(x) = βλx with β = (1 + γ)/(1 + γ − τ), as shown
by Constantinides (1983, footnote 6). The solution to equation (B.2) is D1(x,m) =
1−τp
r c
1+( l
1
x )
γ
1−τ [(1−α)V ∗(l1)−1−τpr c1] = 1−τ
p
r c
1[1−ω( l1x )
γ
1−τ ], where the total bankruptcy
cost ω is defined by
ω = 1− 1− τ
e
1− τp
γ(1− α)
1 + γ − τ .
The market value of an optimally capitalized firm (with endogenous basis) is p∗(x, x) +
D∗(x, x) with functional forms for p∗ and D∗ given by equations (17, 19). This expression
is maximized for a coupon flow of c∗(x) = ϑ1+γγ
λ
δ x with constant ϑ defined by expression
(27). The optimal static leverage ratio, D
∗(x,x)
p∗(x,x)+D∗(x,x) , is then given by expression (26).
Valuation of Equity and Debt Claims Before Investment: Valuations before
investment depend on both the investor’s own basis B ∈ B0(m) and the basis of the
managerial decision maker, p0(m,m). The latter determines the optimal investment
trigger u(m) and the financing mix (c1(m), n1(m)). In period 0 the set of feasible tax
bases is B0(m) = {B : p0(m,m) ≤ B ≤ supx≥m p0(u(x), x)}, m ∈ M (there exist no
shares with B < p0(m,m)).
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Private equity valuation v0(x,m;B): The solution to equations (9, 10) is standard.
Shareholders receive pre-tax cash flows piXt−c0 while the firm takes no action (default or
restructuring). Once operating income Xt falls to b0(Mt;B), shareholders sell all shares
with basis B and receive after-tax proceeds per share of (1 − τ)p0(b0(Mt;B),Mt) + τB.
When the firm exercises its real option, equity is worth v1(u(Mt),Mt;B). Let ϕ0b(x,m;B)
and ϕ0u(x,m;B) be state-contingent claims that pay either a single unit when Xt hits the
basis-reset threshold b0(Mt;B) before the investment boundary u(Mt) (subscript b) or
vice versa (subscript u). The solutions to ϕ0b and ϕ
0
u are standard. Let ϕ
1
b(x,m;B) =
( b
1(m;B)
x )
γ and ϕ1l (x,m) = (
l1(m)
x )
γ be state-contingent claims that pay either a single
unit when Xt hits the basis-reset threshold b1(m;B) or the default threshold l1(m),
respectively.
Stock price p0(x,m): The stock price before investment, p0(x,m), can again be de-
termined using the optimality conditions for tax-loss selling, much like in equation (B.1).
In case x > m, the optimality conditions for an investor with basis B > p0(m,m) are
identical to those in equation (8). As a result, m can be treated as a parameter, which
yields equation (B.4). In case x = m, the relevant optimality conditions are the ones of
the managerial decision maker who must take into consideration that the firm’s policy
depends on her tax timing decision (the state variable m is a decision variable in the tax
timing problem, and only at the optimum it coincides with the running minimum of X).
Let p0(x) ≡ p0(x, x). The optimality conditions are as follows in case x = m:
Tax-Loss Selling:
v0(m,m; p0(m)) = p0(m),
v0x(m,m; p
0(m)) = (1− τ)p0x(m).
Default:
v0(l0, l0; 0) = p0(l0) = 0,
v0x(l
0, l0; 0) = p0x(l
0) = 0.
(B.3)
In the set {(x,m) : x = m} there exists a one-to-one mapping between tax-loss selling
trigger b and tax basis B. One obtains the following free-boundary problem for l0,
p0(x,m), and p0(x):
p0x(x,m) =
1
1− τ v
0
x(x,m; p
0(x,m)) for m < x < u(m),
p0(x,m) = p1(x,m) for x = u(m),
p0(x,m) = p0(m) for x = m.
(B.4)
p0x(x) =
1
1− τ v
0
x(x, x; p
0(x)) for l0 < x < u(x),
p0(x) = p1(x, x) for x = u(x),
p0(x) = 0 and p0x(x) = 0 for x = l
0.
(B.5)
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The solution to equations (B.4, B.5) is a second-order Volterra integral equation for
p0(x,m) that can be reduced to the following first-order integral equation:
p0(x,m) = f(x,m)p0(m) +
1
1− τ
∫ x
m
g(x,m, z)dz , m ≤ x ≤ u(m), (B.6)
p0(x) ≡ p0(x, x) = 1
1− τ
∫ x
l0
h(x, z)dz , l0 ≤ x ≤ u(x), (B.7)
where
f(x,m) ≡ e 11−τ
∫ x
m Φu(s,m)Ψ1(s,m)dsΨ0(x,m,m),
g(x,m, z) ≡ e 11−τ
∫ x
z Φu(s,m)Ψ1(s,m)dsΨ0(x,m, z)Ψ2(z,m),
h(x, z) ≡ e 11−τ
∫ x
z (Φb(s,s)+Φu(s,s)Ψ1(s,s))dsΨ2(z, z).
Let x ≡ x/u(m). The functions Φb(x,m), Φu(x,m), Ψ0(x,m, z), Ψ1(x,m), Ψ2(x,m)
equal
Φb(x,m) ≡ ∂ϕ
0
b(x,m; p
0(x,m))
∂x
=
ηxγ − γxη
xη − xγ x
−1,
Φu(x,m) ≡ ∂ϕ
0
u(x,m; p
0(x,m))
∂x
=
γ − η
xη − xγ x
−1,
Ψ0(x,m, z) ≡ e
1
1−τ
∫ x
z Φb(s,m)ds = ϕ0b(x,m; p
0(z,m))
1
1−τ = [
xη − xγ
(x/z)γxη − xγ(x/z)η ]
1
1−τ ,
Ψ1(x,m) ≡ ϕ1b(u(m),m; p0(x,m)),
Ψ2(x,m) ≡ {piλ− Φb(x,m)(piλx− δc0) + Φu(x,m)[(1/n1 − pi)λu(m)
−δ(c1/n1 − c0)−Ψ1(x,m)(λb1(x,m)− δc1)/n1]},
where b1(x,m) ≡ b1(m; p0(x,m)) determines how the tax timing thresholds shift after
investment.
C Value-maximizing investment and financing policies
Apply backward induction as follows: First, solve for the optimal financing mix, c1 =
c1(u(m),m) and n1 = n1(u(m),m), taking m and u(m) as given. Then, determine
the investment trigger u(m) for each m ∈ M while imposing the optimal financing and
optimal bankruptcy policies.
Budget constraint. The budget constraint (6) can be expressed in terms of (c1, n1)
as
E1(u(m),m|c1)(1− 1
n1
) + ∆D(u(m),m|c1)− I = 0, (C.1)
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where E1(x,m) denotes the market value of the firm’s equity:
E1(x,m|c1) = βλx− δc1 −
(
l1(m)
x
) γ
1−τ (
βλl1(m)− δc1) . (C.2)
The Implicit Function Theorem guarantees the existence of a differentiable policy function
n1(x,m|c1), linking the total debt coupon to the size of the equity offering. One obtains
∂
∂c1
n1(x,m|c1)−1 = 1
E1
[
∂E1(x,m|c1)
∂c1
(1− 1
n1
) +
∂∆D(x,m|c1)
∂c1
]
, (C.3)
∂
∂x
n1(x,m|c1)−1 = 1
E1
[
∂E1(x,m|c1)
∂x
(1− 1
n1
) +
∂∆D(x,m|c1)
∂x
]
, (C.4)
with
∂
∂c1
E1(x,m|c1) = −δ
[
1− ϕ1l (x,m|c1)
1
1−τ
]
,
∂
∂c1
∆D(x,m|c1) = 1− τ
p
r
{
1− αϕ1l (x,m|c1)
1
1−τ
[
1 +
γ
1− τ
(
1− c
0
c1
)]}
,
∂
∂x
E1(x,m|c1) =
[
βλx+
γ
1− τ ϕ
1
l (x,m|c1)
1
1−τ (βλl1 − δc1)
]
1
x
,
∂
∂x
∆D(x,m|c1) = γ
1− τ αϕ
1
l (x,m|c1)
1
1−τ
1− τp
r
(
c1 − c0
x
)
.
In equations (C.3, C.4) we have used that the optimal bankruptcy trigger l1 = l1(c1) is
affine in c1, and ∂
∂l1
E1(x,m|c1) = 0 by optimality of l1
Optimal financing. Denote by c1(x,m) and n1(x,m|c1) the financing policy given
(x,m). Optimal financing at x = u(m) requires the following necessary and sufficient
first-order condition to hold for c1 ≥ 0:
∂
∂c1
v1(u(m),m; p0(m,m)|c1, n1(u(m),m|c1)) = 0, (C.5)
where
∂
∂c1
v1(x,m;B|c1, n1(x,m|c1)) = (λx− δc1)∂n
1(x,m|c1)−1
∂c1
− δ
n1
+ ϕ1b(x,m;B)
×[(1− τ)∂p
1(b1,m|c1, n1)
∂c1
− (λb1 − δc1)∂n
1(x,m|c1)−1
∂c1
+
δ
n1
], (C.6)
∂
∂c1
p1(x,m|c1, n1(x,m|c1)) = E1∂n
1(x,m|c1)−1
∂c1
+ (
1
n1
)
∂E1(x,m|c1)
∂c1
. (C.7)
In (C.6) we have used that ∂
∂b1
v1(x,m;B|c1, n1) = ∂
∂l1
v1(x,m;B|c1, n1) = 0, by optimality
of l1 and b1. The solution to equation (C.5) is a policy function m 7→ c1(m) for m ∈M .
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Investment threshold. Take c1(x,m) and n1(x,m|c1) as given. Given m, optimal-
ity of u(m) requires the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to be
satisfied at x = u(m):
v0(x,m; p0(m,m)) = v1(x,m; p0(m,m)|c1(x,m), n1(x,m|c1)), (C.8)
∂
∂x
v0(x,m; p0(m,m)) =
∂
∂x
v1(x,m; p0(m,m)|c1(x,m), n1(x,m|c1)). (C.9)
The right-hand side and the left-hand side of equation (C.9), respectively, equal
∂
∂x
v1(·) = (λx− δc1)∂n
1(x,m|c1)−1
∂x
+
λ
n1
+ ϕ1b(x,m;B)
×{[(1− τ)n1B − (λb1 − δc1)]∂n
1(x,m|c1)−1
∂x
− γ 1
x
(B − λb
1 − δc1
n1
)}, (C.10)
∂
∂x
v0(·) = piλ+ ∂
∂x
ϕ0b(x,m;B)[B − (piλb0(m;B)− δc0)]
+
∂
∂x
ϕ0u(x,m;B)[v
1(u(m),m;B)− (piλu(m)− δc0)], (C.11)
since ∂∂xp
1(b1,m|c1(x,m), n1(x,m|c1)) = n1B ∂∂xn1(x,m|c1)−1. In equation (C.10), b1 =
b1(m;B) and c1 can be treated as constants since optimal financing requires ∂
∂c1
v1(x,m;B|
c1, n1(x,m|c1)) = 0.
D Proof of proposition 4
The firm’s financial policy can be characterized by a policy function c1(x,m|B), repre-
senting the total promised debt coupon flow after investment given the owners’ basis B
(the budget constraint (C.1) yields the number of shares outstanding after investment,
n1(x,m|B)). The claim
∂
∂B
c1(x,m|B) =
∂2v1(x,m;B|c1,b1)
∂c1∂b1
∂b1(m;B)
∂B +
∂2v1(x,m;B|c1)
∂c1∂B
−∂2v1(x,m;B|c1)
(∂c1)2
≥ 0 (D.1)
requires the numerator in equation (D.1) to be positive, since the second-order optimality
condition for c1(x,m|B) yields that the denominator in (D.1) is positive. After some
algebra the numerator in equation (D.1) equals
(−τ) γ
b1(m;B)
ϕ1b(x,m;B|c1)
∂p1(b1(m;B),m|c1)/∂c1
∂p1(b1(m;B),m)/∂b1
.
By the Implicit Function Theorem and the property ∂∂xp
1(x,m) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ m,
∂p1(b1(m;B),m)
∂b1
=
(
∂b1(m;B)
∂B
)−1
≥ 0. (D.2)
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So the claim (D.1) is verified if and only if at the optimal financing mix,
∂p1(b1(m;B),m|c1)
∂c1
|c1=c1(x,m|B) ≤ 0,
Using equations (C.3, C.7),
∂p1(b1(m;B),m|c1)
∂c1
|c1=c1(x,m|B)
= I(x,m;B|c1){β[b1(m;B)− ϕ1l (b1(m;B),m)
1
1−τ l1][1− ϕ1b(u(m),m;B)]
− [u(m)− ϕ1b(u(m),m;B)b1(m;B)][1− ϕ1l (b1(m;B),m)
1
1−τ ]} (D.3)
where
I(x,m;B|c1) ≡ λ∂(1/n
1)/∂c1
1− ϕ1b(u(m),m;B) + ϕ1b(u(m),m;B)(1− τ)[1− ϕ1l (b1(m;B),m)
1
1−τ ]
≥ 0.
It remains to show that the term in equation (D.3) enclosed in curly brackets is negative.
This amounts to an inequality of the form
β
1− z1+ γ1−τ
1− z γ1−τ
≤ 1− x
1+γ
x− x1+γ for all z,x ∈ (0, 1), (D.4)
where z ≡ l1/b1(m;B) and x ≡ b1(m;B)/u(m). By L’Hospital’s rule, the l.h.s of equation
(D.4) is monotonically increasing in z on (0, 1) and bounded above by 1 + 1γ . The r.h.s
of equation (D.4) is monotonically decreasing in x and bounded below by 1 + 1γ .
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Figure 1: State space of the dynamic investment problem.
The state space of the dynamic investment problem can be partitioned into various domains including a
default region (L) where it is optimal for shareholders to default immediately, an investment region (U)
where it is optimal to invest, and an inaction or continuation region (C). The arrows indicate the feasible
direction of movement in the state space for the cases x > m and x = m.
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Figure 2: The timing of investment.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics.
The figure plots the firm’s investment boundary (left) and the target leverage ratio (right) for different
values of the capital gains tax rate τ . The line marked Basis = 0 corresponds to a basis-price ratio of
zero, and the line marked Basis = Price corresponds to a basis-price ratio of one at the investment date.
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Figure 4: Default boundary.
The different panels plot the default boundary before (solid) and after (dashed) exercise of the real option
for different parameter values. The default boundary is expressed in terms of the interest coverage ratio
at the point of default, pil0/c0 and l1/c1, respectively.
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Table 1: Parameter values.
Parameter Value Description
r 5% After-tax risk-free rate
µ 3% Drift of operating income process
σ 25% Volatility of operating income process
α 25% Default cost
τ 25% Capital gains tax rate
τp, τd 30% Ordinary income tax rate on interest or dividends
τc 20% Effective corporate income tax rate
pi 80% Growth potential of the firm
Table 2: Investment Policy.
Table 2 reports comparative statics on the selected investment threshold contingent on the past perfor-
mance of the firm. The first panel reports the investment trigger in terms of the state variable, and the
second panel in terms of the threshold market-to-book ratio. Across columns the ratio of the owner’s tax
basis relative to the stock price at the investment date varies from 0 to 1. The last column allows for a
comparison of the investment triggers to the case when the tax rate on capital gains is nil.
Basis-price ratio Variation Benchmark
0 0.5 1 (0-1)/1 τ = 0%
PANEL A: Investment threshold [u(m)/I in %]
Base 58.4 32.0 27.9 109% 55.2
τ = 15% 56.6 39.5 36.0 57% 55.2
τ = 35% 61.0 26.0 21.9 178% 55.2
τ = 45% 63.9 21.5 17.4 268% 55.2
µ = 2% 62.0 40.2 36.5 70% 59.5
µ = 4% 55.1 20.5 16.9 227% 51.4
σ = 15% 40.2 24.4 19.1 110% 35.5
σ = 50% 119.7 64.6 60.5 98% 132.7
τc = 15% 62.2 34.5 29.9 108% 58.8
τc = 25% 54.0 29.9 26.5 104% 51.8
α = 10% 56.5 29.1 25.4 123% 51.7
α = 50% 60.4 35.5 31.3 93% 59.3
pi = 50% 25.4 19.2 17.8 42% 27.2
pi = 100% 322.8 56.1 45.2 615% 158.5
PANEL B: Market-to-book equity at the investment date [E1/( pi
1−pi I)]
Base 2.6 1.1 0.9 203% 1.6
τ = 15% 2.1 1.3 1.1 92% 1.6
τ = 35% 3.5 0.9 0.7 410% 1.6
τ = 45% 5.4 0.8 0.5 885% 1.6
µ = 2% 1.9 0.9 0.8 140% 1.2
µ = 4% 4.9 1.4 1.0 387% 3.0
σ = 15% 1.4 0.6 0.4 238% 0.8
σ = 50% 6.4 2.9 2.6 145% 4.8
τc = 15% 3.7 1.4 1.1 233% 2.1
τc = 25% 2.0 0.9 0.7 179% 1.3
α = 10% 2.2 0.8 0.6 261% 1.2
α = 50% 3.1 1.5 1.2 155% 2.2
pi = 50% 4.5 2.6 2.2 101% 3.2
pi = 100% 0.6 0.1 0.1 955% 0.2
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Table 3: Financial Policy.
Table 3 reports comparative statics results on the ex-post optimal capital structure of the firm. The first
panel reports the target leverage ratio after the second round of financing. The second panel reports
the credit spread at the target leverage ratio. Across the different columns, the ratio of the owner’s tax
basis relative to the stock price at the refinancing date varies from 0 to 1. The last column allows for a
comparison of the leverage levels to the case when the tax rate on capital gains is nil.
Basis-price ratio Variation Benchmark
0 0.5 1 (0-1)/1 τ = 0%
PANEL A: Target leverage [in %]
Base 47.6 60.5 64.3 -26% 61.2
τ = 15% 54.6 60.8 62.9 -13% 61.2
τ = 35% 35.3 60.3 65.9 -46% 61.2
τ = 45% 4.4 59.6 67.8 -94% 61.2
µ = 2% 46.9 59.5 62.9 -25% 59.9
µ = 4% 48.2 61.6 65.7 -27% 62.5
σ = 15% 58.6 69.9 74.6 -22% 71.4
σ = 50% 41.2 50.6 52.6 -22% 50.6
τc = 15% 33.0 53.5 58.9 -44% 55.1
τc = 25% 56.4 65.7 68.4 -17% 65.8
α = 10% 54.5 68.6 72.3 -25% 70.4
α = 50% 39.9 51.4 55.0 -27% 50.4
pi = 50% 49.0 60.8 64.3 -24% 61.2
pi = 100% 46.6 60.4 64.3 -28% 61.2
PANEL B: Credit spread at target leverage [in bp]
Base 58.4 103.2 120.9 -52% 168.8
τ = 15% 100.5 128.7 139.9 -28% 168.8
τ = 35% 21.3 79.1 102.4 -79% 168.8
τ = 45% 0.1 55.5 84.3 -99% 168.8
µ = 2% 73.5 122.4 140.0 -48% 195.2
µ = 4% 45.8 86.6 104.4 -56% 145.8
σ = 15% 11.7 29.2 42.2 -72% 58.6
σ = 50% 382.5 479.0 501.6 -24% 688.1
τc = 15% 28.6 77.9 97.5 -71% 137.3
τc = 25% 84.7 126.6 142.4 -41% 197.3
α = 10% 68.2 122.0 141.8 -52% 200.2
α = 50% 49.6 87.0 102.5 -52% 140.4
pi = 50% 62.5 104.6 120.9 -48% 168.8
pi = 100% 55.8 102.6 120.9 -54% 168.8
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Table 4: Value Improvement Associated with State-Contingent Policies.
Table 4 reports comparative statics results on the impact of state-contingent policies on the wealth of
incumbents. The value creation is measured in terms of the increase in private valuations following a
switch from market value maximizing policy choices to path-dependent private value maximizing policy
choices. Across the different columns, the firm’s past performance varies from worst (m = l0) to best
(m = m). Zero corresponds to the worst performance and a zero basis-price ratio. One corresponds to
the best performance (no past drop in operating performance below u(m)) and a basis-price ratio of one.
Performance history h(m) = (m− l0)/(m− l0)
Poor (0) Medium (.33) Good (.67)
Base 3.4% 1.1% 0.1%
τ = 15% 1.2% 0.3% 0.0%
τ = 35% 7.4% 2.6% 0.3%
τ = 45% 14.2% 5.7% 0.7%
µ = 2% 2.8% 0.8% 0.1%
µ = 4% 4.6% 1.7% 0.2%
σ = 15% 5.7% 3.3% 0.6%
σ = 50% 1.1% 0.1% 0.0%
τc = 15% 3.6% 1.2% 0.1%
τc = 25% 3.3% 1.0% 0.1%
α = 10% 4.1% 1.2% 0.1%
α = 50% 2.7% 0.8% 0.1%
pi = 50% 2.2% 0.7% 0.1%
pi = 100% 5.6% 2.1% 0.2%
Table 5: Managerial Discretion and State-Contingent Policies.
Table 5 reports comparative statics results on the change in the selected investment threshold, target
capital structure, and improvement in private values associated with policy choices that reflect the tax
basis of the manager. In this table, the basis-price ratio for the manager’s stock is set to 25% (BPu = 0.25).
∆ Investment ∆ Leverage ∆ Value
Base 45.1% -13.9% 1.4%
τ = 15% 26.2% -7.5% 0.4%
τ = 35% 66.7% -22.1% 3.2%
τ = 45% 96.8% -34.1% 6.7%
µ = 2% 30.4% -13.3% 1.0%
µ = 4% 73.6% -14.3% 2.2%
σ = 15% 72.2% -14.0% 3.8%
σ = 50% 22.8% -9.6% 0.2%
τc = 15% 49.0% -22.5% 1.6%
τc = 25% 41.4% -9.4% 1.3%
α = 10% 46.4% -12.4% 1.6%
α = 50% 41.2% -15.1% 1.1%
pi = 50% 20.7% -12.6% 0.8%
pi = 100% 105.5% -14.8% 2.8%
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Table 8: Personal Tax Effects on Corporate Investment.
The table reports the coefficients from regressions of the form
Investmentt = c0+c1Shareholders
′ Tax Basis/Ot−1+c2Price/Ot−1+c3M/Bt−1+c4Cash F lowt−1
+ c5Asset Tangibilityt−1 + c6Sizet−1 + c7Profitabilityt−1 + c8R&Dt−1 + c9RDDt−1 + t.
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the industry level defined by three-digit SIC codes and reported
in parentheses. The dependent variable Investmentt is the total investment during the financial year t−1
through t normalized by beginning of-the-year assets. All other variables are defined as described in the
main text. The constant term and the coefficient on the dummy variable RDDt−1 are not reported.
In Panel A, all regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. For robustness, Panel B reports the
coefficients on the corresponding basis proxy for alternative specifications. In the last two specifications
in Panel B, Tax Basis/Ot−1 and Price/Ot−1 are replaced by their ratio, Basis-Price Ratiot−1. Panel C
reports estimation results from a logit analysis with firm fixed effects on the probability of large investment
expenditures over the first five years following the IPO. The dependent variable takes a value of one if
investment expenditures exceed industry average, and zero otherwise.
Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders
Basis Proxy I Basis Proxy II Basis Proxy III
PANEL A: Regression analysis
Tax Basis/Ot−1 14.77∗∗∗ 14.98∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗
(3.23) (3.98) (0.44)
Price/Ot−1 0.10 0.12 −1.63∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.28) (0.37)
M/Bt−1 1.55∗ 1.78∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗
(0.81) (0.81) (0.79)
Cash F lowt−1 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Asset Tangibilityt−1 −0.54∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Sizet−1 −17.12∗∗∗ −17.31∗∗∗ −18.73∗∗∗
(2.75) (2.75) (2.79)
Profitabilityt−1 0.18∗ 0.19∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
R&Dt−1 0.39∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 25, 779 25, 779 25, 779
PANEL B: Robustness – alternative specifications (coef. c1 on basis proxy reported)
Tax Basis/Ot−1 12.72∗∗∗ 13.79∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗
[random effect] (3.02) (3.56) (0.43)
Tax Basis/Ot 28.80∗∗∗ 23.36∗∗∗ 7.93∗∗∗
[fixed effect IV] (3.56) (3.24) (1.45)
Basis-Price Ratiot−1 10.41∗∗∗ −0.25 4.01∗
[fixed effect] (3.01) (0.75) (2.08)
PANEL C: Logit analysis of P(Investmentt ≥ Industry Avg.)
Tax Basis/Ot−1 2.17∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ −0.03
[fixed effect] (0.29) (0.40) (0.17)
Tax Basis/Ot−1 1.42∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗ −0.18
[random effect] (0.18) (0.24) (0.13)
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Table 9: Individual Ownership & Sensitivity of Corporate Investment to
Personal Taxes.
For each subsample of firms defined by the portion of stock held by individual investors, the table reports
the coefficients from regressions of the form
Investmentt = c0+c1Shareholders
′ Tax Basis/Ot−1+c2Price/Ot−1+c3M/Bt−1+c4Cash F lowt−1
+ c5Asset Tangibilityt−1 + c6Sizet−1 + c7Profitabilityt−1 + c8R&Dt−1 + c9RDDt−1 + t.
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the industry level defined by three-digit SIC codes and reported
in parentheses. The dependent variable Investmentt is the total investment during the financial year t−1
through t normalized by beginning of-the-year assets. All other variables are defined as described in the
main text. All regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. The constant term and the coefficients
on Asset Tangibilityt−1, Sizet−1, Profitabilityt−1, R&Dt−1, and the dummy variable RDDt−1 are not
reported. Panel A splits the sample of firms by the portion of stock held by individual investors directly
or through mutual funds. Panel B splits the sample of firms by the portion of stock held directly by
individual investors. In the second part of each panel we report the coefficients c1 on Tax Basis/Ot−1
for alternative proxies for the tax basis.
Individual Ownership
0− 100% ≥ 80% 50− 80% < 50%
PANEL A: Total Individual Ownership
Tax Basis/Ot−1 14.81∗∗∗ 17.32∗∗∗ 4.45∗∗∗ 1.16
(3.22) (5.26) (1.33) (1.17)
Price/Ot−1 0.17 −1.87∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.05
(0.23) (0.64) (0.15) (0.04)
M/Bt−1 1.77∗∗ 4.34∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.76) (1.29) (0.26) (0.08)
Cash F lowt−1 0.02 0.03 0.02 −0.01
(0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 23, 994 12, 768 8, 058 3, 168
Robustness check – alternative basis proxies (coef. c1 on Tax Basis/Ot−1 reported)
Basis Proxy II 12.46∗∗∗ 15.40∗∗ 4.38∗∗∗ 0.82
(3.82) (6.37) (1.66) (1.26)
Basis Proxy III 1.87∗∗∗ 0.74 0.23∗ 0.03
(0.37) (1.66) (0.12) (0.06)
PANEL B: Direct Individual Ownership
Tax Basis/Ot−1 14.81∗∗∗ 22.47∗∗∗ 4.21∗∗ 1.89∗∗
(3.22) (6.00) (1.91) (0.87)
Price/Ot−1 0.17 −2.50∗∗∗ −0.36∗ −0.04
(0.23) (0.81) (0.19) (0.04)
M/Bt−1 1.77∗∗ 4.75∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.76) (1.54) (0.34) (0.08)
Cash F lowt−1 0.02 0.04 −0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 23, 994 10, 313 8, 041 5, 640
Robustness check – alternative basis proxies (coef. c1 on Tax Basis/Ot−1 reported)
Basis Proxy II 12.46∗∗∗ 21.79∗∗∗ 4.34∗∗ 2.26∗∗
(3.82) (7.54) (2.20) (1.06)
Basis Proxy III 1.87∗∗∗ 0.30 0.08 0.05
(0.37) (2.28) (0.35) (0.08)
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Table 10: Personal Tax Effects on External Financing.
The table reports the coefficients from regressions of the form
Equity Issuancet = c0+c1Shareholders
′ Tax Basis/Ot−1+c2Price/Ot−1+c3M/Bt−1+c4M/B
efwa
t−1
+ c5CFt−1 + c6Tangibilityt−1 + c7Sizet−1 + c8Profitabilityt−1 + c9R&Dt−1 + c10RDDt−1 + t
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the industry level defined by three-digit SIC codes and reported
in parentheses. The dependent variable Equity Issuancet is the change in book equity net of the change
in retained earnings during the financial year t− 1 through t divided by year-end assets in the IPO year.
Equity-Debt Mixt is the portion of external funds raised in the form of equity during the financial year
and takes values between zero and one. All other variables are defined as described in the main text.
The constant term and the coefficient on the dummy variable RDDt−1 are not reported. In Panel A,
all regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. For robustness, Panel B reports the coefficients on
the corresponding basis proxy for alternative specifications. In the last two specifications in Panel B,
Tax Basis/Ot−1 and Price/Ot−1 are replaced by their ratio, Basis-Price Ratiot−1. Panel C reports
estimation results for the effect of the tax basis on the Equity-Debt Mixt as dependent variable.
Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders
Basis Proxy I Basis Proxy II Basis Proxy III
PANEL A: Equity Issuancet
Tax Basis/Ot−1 −8.57∗∗∗ −8.32∗∗∗ −0.83∗∗
(1.83) (1.88) (0.39)
Price/Ot−1 −0.50∗∗ −0.51∗∗ 0.04
(0.20) (0.20) (0.28)
M/Bt−1 8.80∗∗∗ 8.68∗∗∗ 8.54∗∗∗
(1.45) (1.44) (1.45)
M/Befwat−1 1.48 1.44 1.27
(1.62) (1.63) (1.66)
Cash F lowt−1 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Asset Tangibilityt−1 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Sizet−1 −4.35∗∗∗ −4.23∗∗∗ −3.55∗∗∗
(0.89) (0.91) (0.96)
Profitabilityt−1 −0.24∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
R&Dt−1 1.11∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Observations 25, 502 25, 502 25, 502
PANEL B: Robustness – alternative specifications (coef. c1 on basis proxy reported)
Tax Basis/Ot−1 1.37 1.13 −0.94∗∗∗
[random effect] (0.90) (1.00) (0.34)
Tax Basis/Ot −19.25∗∗∗ −15.47∗∗∗ −2.76∗∗∗
[fixed effect IV] (2.33) (2.11) (0.92)
Basis-Price Ratiot−1 −1.23 −0.12 −8.69∗∗∗
[fixed effect] (1.80) (0.57) (1.00)
PANEL C: Equity-Debt Mix (coef. c1 on basis proxy reported)
Tax Basis/Ot−1 −13.41∗∗∗ −10.77∗∗∗ −1.16∗∗
[fixed effect] (2.87) (2.87) (0.51)
Tax Basis/Ot−1 −8.82∗∗∗ −8.92∗∗∗ −0.47
[random effect] (1.19) (1.22) (0.46)
Tax Basis/Ot −25.78∗∗∗ −16.61∗∗∗ −3.72∗∗∗
[fixed effect IV] (3.11) (2.83) (1.20)
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Table 11: Individual Ownership & Sensitivity of External Financing to Per-
sonal Taxes.
For each subsample of firms defined by the portion of stock held by individual investors, the table reports
the coefficients from regressions of the form
Equity Issuancet = c0+c1Shareholders
′ Tax Basis/Ot−1+c2Price/Ot−1+c3M/Bt−1+c4M/B
efwa
t−1
+ c5CFt−1 + c6Tangibilityt−1 + c7Sizet−1 + c8Profitabilityt−1 + c9R&Dt−1 + c10RDDt−1 + t.
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the industry level defined by three-digit SIC codes and re-
ported in parentheses. The dependent variable Equity Issuancet is the change in book equity net of
the change in retained earnings during the financial year t− 1 through t normalized by beginning of-the-
year assets. All other variables are defined as described in the main text. All regressions are estimated
with firm fixed effects. The constant term and the coefficients on M/Bt−1, M/B
efwa
t−1 , Cash F lowt−1,
Asset Tangibilityt−1, Sizet−1, Profitabilityt−1, R&Dt−1, and the dummy variable RDDt−1 are not re-
ported. Panel A splits the sample of firms by the portion of stock held by individual investors directly
or through mutual funds. Panel B splits the sample of firms by the portion of stock held directly by
individual investors. The second part in each panel reports the coefficients on Tax Basis/Ot−1 for the
alternative definitions of the investors’ tax basis.
Individual Ownership
0− 100% ≥ 80% 50− 80% < 50%
PANEL A: Total individual ownership
Tax Basis/Ot−1 −9.06∗∗∗ −12.09∗∗∗ −5.42 −6.56∗
(1.82) (1.83) (3.40) (3.83)
Price/Ot−1 −0.54∗∗ −1.03∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗ −0.28∗
(0.21) (0.30) (0.30) (0.15)
M/Bt−1 8.87∗∗∗ 9.86∗∗∗ 8.14∗∗∗ 7.25∗∗∗
(1.49) (1.28) (1.99) (1.50)
Cash F lowt−1 0.19∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 23, 940 12, 704 8, 065 3, 171
Robustness check – alternative basis proxies (coef. c1 on Tax Basis/Ot−1 reported)
Basis Proxy II −8.73∗∗∗ −10.51∗∗∗ −6.11 −8.17∗
(2.01) (2.61) (4.65) (4.62)
Basis Proxy III −0.68 −3.94∗∗∗ −0.21 0.88∗
(0.43) (1.04) (0.45) (0.47)
PANEL B: Direct individual ownership
Tax Basis/Ot−1 −9.06∗∗∗ −12.17∗∗∗ −10.62∗∗∗ −2.99
(1.82) (2.11) (3.67) (2.45)
Price/Ot−1 −0.54∗∗ −0.99∗∗ −1.01∗∗∗ −0.42
(0.21) (0.41) (0.31) (0.27)
M/Bt−1 8.87∗∗∗ 9.44∗∗∗ 7.93∗∗∗ 8.57∗∗∗
(1.49) (1.16) (1.52) (2.28)
Cash F lowt−1 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17 0.34∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.14) (0.06)
Observations 23, 940 10, 231 8, 058 5, 651
Robustness check – alternative basis proxies (coef. c1 on Tax Basis/Ot−1 reported)
Basis Proxy II −8.73∗∗∗ −11.29∗∗∗ −11.21∗∗ −3.65
(2.01) (3.25) (4.63) (3.27)
Basis Proxy III −0.68 −4.18∗∗∗ −0.84 0.35
(0.43) (1.23) (0.55) (0.44)
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